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苏菲的世界 Sophies World(二)

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发表于 2019-1-27 11:41:59 | 只看该作者 回帖奖励 |倒序浏览 |阅读模式
Descartes

... he wanted to clear all the rubble off the site

Alberto stood up, took off the red cloak, and laid it over a chair. Then he settled himself once again in the corner of the sofa.

"Rene Descartes was born in 1596 and lived in a number of different European countries at various periods of his life. Even as a young man he had a strong desire to achieve insight into the nature of man and the universe. But after studying philosophy he became increasingly convinced of his own ignorance."

"Like Socrates?"

"More or less like him, yes. Like Socrates, he was convinced that certain knowledge is only attainable through reason. We can never trust what the old books tell us. We cannot even trust what our senses tell us."

"Plato thought that too. He believed that only reason can give us certain knowledge."

"Exactly. There is a direct line of descent from Socrates and Plato via St. Augustine to Descartes. They were all typical rationalists, convinced that reason was the only path to knowledge. After comprehensive studies, Descartes came to the conclusion that the body of knowledge handed down from the Middle Ages was not necessarily reliable. You can compare him to Socrates, who did not trust the general views he encountered in the central square of Athens. So what does one do, Sophie? Can you tell me that?"

"You begin to work out your own philosophy."

"Right! Descartes decided to travel around Europe, the way Socrates spent his life talking to people in Athens. He relates that from then on he meant to confine himself to seeking the wisdom that was to be found, either within himself or in the 'great book of the world.' So he joined the army and went to war, which enabled him to spend periods of time in different parts of Central Europe. Later he lived for some years in Paris, but in 1629 he went to Holland, where he remained for nearly twenty years working on his mathematical and philosophic writings.

"In 1649 he was invited to Sweden by Queen Christina. But his sojourn in what he called 'the land of bears, ice, and rocks' brought on an attack of pneumonia and he died in the winter of 1650."

"So he was only 54 when he died."

"Yes, but he was to have enormous influence on philosophy, even after his death. One can say without exaggeration that Descartes was the father of modern philosophy. Following the heady rediscovery of man and nature in the Renaissance, the need to assemble contemporary thought into one coherent philosophical system again presented itself. The first significant system-builder was Descartes, and he was followed by Spinoza and Leibniz, Locke and Berkeley, Hume and Kant."

"What do you mean by a philosophical system?"

"I mean a philosophy that is constructed from the ground up and that is concerned with finding explanations for all the central questions of philosophy. Antiquity had its great system-constructors in Plato and Aristotle. The Middle Ages had St. Thomas Aquinas, who tried to build a bridge between Aristotle's philosophy and Christian theology. Then came the Renais-sance, with a welter of old and new beliefs about nature and science, God and man. Not until the seventeenth century did philosophers make any attempt to assemble the new ideas into a clarified philosophical system, and the first to attempt it was Descartes. His work was the forerunner of what was to be philosophy's most important project in the coming generations. His main concern was with what we can know, or in other words, certain knowledge. The other great question that preoccupied him was the relationship between body and mind. Both these questions were the substance of philosophical argument for the next hundred and fifty years."

"He must have been ahead of his time."

"Ah, but the question belonged to the age. When it came to acquiring certain knowledge, many of his contemporaries voiced a total philosophic skepticism. They thought that man should accept that he knew nothing. But Descartes would not. Had he done so he would not have been a real philosopher. We can again draw a parallel with Socrates, who did not accept the skepticism of the Sophists. And it was in Descartes's lifetime that the new natural sciences were developing a method by which to provide certain and exact descriptions of natural processes.

"Descartes was obliged to ask himself if there was a similar certain and exact method of philosophic reflection."

"That I can understand."

"But that was only part of it. The new physics had also raised the question of the nature of matter, and thus what determines the physical processes of nature. More and more people argued in favor of a mechanistic view of nature. But the more mechanistic the physical world was seen to be, the more pressing became the question of the relationship between body and soul. Until the seventeenth century, the soul had commonly been considered as a sort of 'breath of life' that pervaded all living creatures. The original meaning of the words 'soul' and 'spirit' is, in fact, 'breath' and 'breathing.' This is the case for almost all European languages. To Aristotle, the soul was something that was present everywhere in the organism as its 'life principle'--and therefore could not be conceived as separate from the body. So he was able to speak of a plant soul or an animal soul. Philosophers did not introduce any radical division of soul and body until the seventeenth century. The reason was that the motions of all material objects--including the body, animal or human--were explained as involving mechanical processes. But man's soul could surely not be part of this body machinery, could it? What of the soul, then? An explanation was required not least of how something 'spiritual' could start a mechanical process."

"It's a strange thought, actually."

"What is?"

"I decide to lift my arm--and then, well, the arm lifts itself. Or I decide to run for a bus, and the next second my legs are moving. Or I'm thinking about something sad, and suddenly I'm crying. So there must be some mysterious connection between body and consciousness."

"That was exactly the problem that set Descartes's thoughts going. Like Plato, he was convinced that there was a sharp division between 'spirit' and 'matter.' But as to how the mind influences the body--or the soul the body--Plato could not provide an answer."

"Neither have I, so I am looking forward to hearing what Descartes's theory was."

"Let us follow his own line of reasoning."

Albert pointed to the book that lay on the table between them.

"In his Discourse on Method, Descartes raises the question of the method the philosopher must use to solve a philosophical problem. Science already had its new method..."

"So you said."

"Descartes maintains that we cannot accept anything as being true unless we can clearly and distinctly perceive it. To achieve this can require the breaking down of a compound problem into as many single factors as possible. Then we can take our point of departure in the simplest idea of all. You could say that every single thought must be weighed and measured, rather in the way Galileo wanted everything to be measured and everything immeasurable to be made measurable. Descartes believed that philosophy should go from the simple to the complex. Only then would it be possible to construct a new insight. And finally it would be necessary to ensure by constant enumeration and control that nothing was left out. Then, a philosophical conclusion would be within reach."

"It sounds almost like a math test."

"Yes. Descartes was a mathematician; he is considered the father of analytical geometry, and he made important contributions to the science of algebra. Descartes wanted to use the 'mathematical method' even for philosophizing. He set out to prove philosophical truths in the way one proves a mathematical theorem. In other words, he wanted to use exactly the same instrument that we use when we work with figures, namely, reason, since only reason can give us certainty. It is far from certain that we can rely on our senses. We have already noted Descartes's affinity with Plato, who also observed that mathematics and numerical ratio give us more certainty than the evidence of our senses."

"But can one solve philosophical problems that way?"

"We had better go back to Descartes's own reasoning. His aim is to reach certainty about the nature of life, and he starts by maintaining that at first one should doubt everything. He didn't want to build on sand, you see."

"No, because if the foundations give way, the whole house collapses."

"As you so neatly put it, my child. Now, Descartes did not think it reasonable to doubt everything, but he thought it was possible in principle to doubt everything. For one thing, it is by no means certain that we advance our philosophical quest by reading Plato or Aristotle. It may increase our knowledge of history but not of the world. It was important for Descartes to rid himself of all handed down, or received, learning before beginning his own philosophical construction."

"He wanted to clear all the rubble off the site before starting to build his new house ..."

"Thank you. He wanted to use only fresh new materials in order to be sure that his new thought construction would hold. But Descartes's doubts went even deeper. We cannot even trust what our senses tell us, he said. Maybe they are deceiving us."

"How come?"

"When we dream, we feel we are experiencing reality. What separates our waking feelings from our dream feelings?

" 'When I consider this carefully, I find not a single property which with certainty separates the waking state from the dream,' writes Descartes. And he goes on: 'How can you be certain that your whole life is not a dream?' "

"Jeppe thought he had only been dreaming when he had slept in the Baron's bed."

"And when he was lying in the Baron's bed, he thought his life as a poor peasant was only a dream. So in the same way, Descartes ends up doubting absolutely everything. Many philosophers before him had reached the end of the road at that very point."

"So they didn't get very far."

"But Descartes tried to work forward from this zero point. He doubted everything, and that was the only thing he was certain of. But now something struck him: one thing had to be true, and that was that he doubted. When he doubted, he had to be thinking, and because he was thinking, it had to be certain that he was a thinking being. Or, as he himself expressed it: Cogito, ergo sum."

"Which means?"

"I think, therefore I am."

"I'm not surprised he realized that."

"Fair enough. But notice the intuitive certainty with which he suddenly perceives himself as a thinking being. Perhaps you now recall what Plato said, that what we grasp with our reason is more real than what we grasp with our senses. That's the way it was for Descartes. He perceived not only that he was a thinking /, he realized at the same time that this thinking / was more real than the material world which we perceive with our senses. And he went on. He was by no means through with his philosophical quest."

"What came next?"

"Descartes now asked himself if there was anything more he could perceive with the same intuitive certainty.

He came to the conclusion that in his mind he had a clear and distinct idea of a perfect entity. This was an idea he had always had, and it was thus self-evident to Descartes that such an idea could not possibly have come from himself. The idea of a perfect entity cannot have originated from one who was himself imperfect, he claimed. Therefore the idea of a perfect entity must have originated from that perfect entity itself, or in other words, from God. That God exists was therefore just as self-evident for Descartes as that a thinking being must exist."

"Now he was jumping to a conclusion. He was more cautious to begin with."

"You're right. Many people have called that his weak spot. But you say 'conclusion.' Actually it was not a question of proof. Descartes only meant that we all possess the idea of a perfect entity, and that inherent in that idea is the fact that this perfect entity must exist. Because a perfect entity wouldn't be perfect if it didn't exist. Neither would we possess the idea of a perfect entity if there were no perfect entity. For we are imperfect, so the idea of perfection cannot come from us. According to Descartes, the idea of God is innate, it is stamped on us from birth 'like the artisan's mark stamped on his product.' "

"Yes, but just because I possess the idea of a crocophant doesn't mean that the crocophant exists."

"Descartes would have said that it is not inherent in the concept of a crocophant that it exists. On the other hand, it is inherent in the concept of a perfect entity that such an entity exists. According to Descartes, this is just as certain as it is inherent in the idea of a circle that all points of the circle are equidistant from the center. You cannot have a circle that does not conform to this law. Nor can you have a perfect entity that lacks its most important property, namely, existence."

"That's an odd way of thinking."

"It is a decidedly rationalistic way of thinking. Descartes believed like Socrates and Plato that there is a connection between reason and being. The more self-evident a thing is to one's reason, the more certain it is that it exists."

"So far he has gotten to the fact that he is a thinking person and that there exists a perfect entity."

"Yes, and with this as his point of departure, he proceeds. In the question of all the ideas we have about outer reality--for example, the sun and the moon--there is the possibility that they are fantasies. But outer reality also has certain characteristics that we can perceive with our reason. These are the mathematical properties, or, in other words, the kinds of things that are measurable, such as length, breadth, and depth. Such 'quantitative' properties are just as clear and distinct to my reason as the fact that I am a thinking being. 'Qualitative' properties such as color, smell, and taste, on the other hand, are linked to our sense perception and as such do not describe outer reality."

"So nature is not a dream after all."

"No, and on that point Descartes once again draws upon our idea of the perfect entity. When our reason recognizes something clearly and distinctly--as is the case for the mathematical properties of outer reality--it must necessarily be so. Because a perfect God would not deceive us. Descartes claims 'God's guarantee' that whatever we perceive with our reason also corresponds to reality."

"Okay, so now he's found out he's a thinking being, God exists, and there is an outer reality."

"Ah, but the outer reality is essentially different from the reality of thought. Descartes now maintains that there are two different forms of reality--or two 'substances.' One substance is thought, or the 'mind,' the other is extension, or matter. The mind is purely conscious, it takes up no room in space and can therefore not be subdivided into smaller parts. Matter, however, is purely extension, it takes up room in space and can therefore always be subdivided into smaller and smaller parts-- but it has no consciousness. Descartes maintained that both substances originate from God, because only God himself exists independently of anything else. But al-though both thought and extension come from God, the two substances have no contact with each other. Thought is quite independent of matter, and conversely, the material processes are quite independent of thought."

"So he divided God's creation into two."

"Precisely. We say that Descartes is a dualist, which means that he effects a sharp division between the reality of thought and extended reality. For example, only man has a mind. Animals belong completely to extended reality. Their living and moving are accomplished me-chanically. Descartes considered an animal to be a kind of complicated automaton. As regards extended reality, he takes a thoroughly mechanistic view--exactly like the materialists."

"I doubt very much that Hermes is a machine or an automaton. Descartes couldn't have liked animals very much. And what about us? Are we automatons as well?"

"We are and we aren't. Descartes came to the conclusion that man is a dual creature that both thinks and takes up room in space. Man has thus both a mind and an extended body. St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas had already said something similar, namely, that man had a body like the animals and a soul like the angels. According to Descartes, the human body is a perfect machine. But man also has a mind which can operate quite independently of the body. The bodily processes do not have the same freedom, they obey their own laws. But what we think with our reason does not happen in the body--it happens in the mind, which is completely independent of extended reality. I should add, by the way, that Descartes did not reject the possibility that animals could think. But if they have that faculty, the same dualism between thought and extension must also apply to them."

"We have talked about this before. If I decide to run after a bus, the whole 'automaton' goes into action. And if I don't catch the bus, I start to cry."

"Even Descartes could not deny that there is a constant interaction between mind and body. As long as the mind is in the body, he believed, it is linked to the brain through a special brain organ which he called the pineal gland, where a constant interaction takes place between 'spirit' and 'matter.' Therefore the mind can constantly be affected by feelings and passions that are related to bodily needs. But the mind can also detach itself from such 'base' impulses and operate independently of the body. The aim is to get reason to assume command. Because even if I have the worst pain in my stomach, the sum of the angles in a triangle will still be 180 de-grees. Thus humans have the capacity to rise above bodily needs and behave rationally. In this sense the mind is superior to the body. Our legs can age and become weak, the back can become bowed and our teeth can fall out--but two and two will go on being four as long as there is reason left in us. Reason doesn't become bowed and weak. It is the body that ages. For Descartes, the mind is essentially thought. Baser passions and feelings such as desire and hate are more closely linked to our bodily functions--and therefore to extended reality."

"I can't get over the fact that Descartes compared the human body to a machine or an automaton."

"The comparison was based on the fact that people in his time were deeply fascinated by machines and the workings of clocks, which appeared to have the ability to function of their own accord. The word 'automaton' means precisely that--something that moves of its own accord. It was obviously only an illusion that they moved of their own accord. An astronomical clock, for instance, is both constructed and wound up by human hands. Descartes made a point of the fact that ingenious inventions of that kind were actually assembled very simply from a relatively small number of parts compared with the vast number of bones, muscles, nerves, veins, and arteries that the human and the animal body consists of. Why should God not be able to make an animal or a human body based on mechanical laws?"

"Nowadays there is a lot of talk about 'artificial intelligence.' "

"Yes, that is the automaton of our time. We have created machines that can sometimes deceive us into believing that they are intelligent. Machines like these would have terrified Descartes out of his wits. He might have begun to doubt whether human reason really was as free and independent as he had supposed. And there are philosophers who believe that man's spiritual life is no more free than the bodily processes. The human soul is naturally infinitely more complex than any data program, but some people think that in principle we are just as unfree as these data programs. But look, Sophie--I'll show you something."

Alberto pointed to a large writing table at the other end of the room. On it stood a small computer. He went over to it. Sophie followed him.

Alberto switched the computer on and soon the screen showed C: at the top. He wrote "Laila," explaining that this was an advanced conversation program.

A text soon appeared at the top of the screen:

"Hi, my name is Laila. Are you sitting comfortably?"

Sophie entered three letters:

"Yes," she wrote although she had not yet sat down. Alberto brought up a chair for her.

"What is your name?" appeared on the screen.

"Sophie Amundsen," wrote Sophie, and the computer answered:

"3 Clover Close. Nice to meet you, Sophie. Are you looking forward to your fifteenth birthday?"

Sophie was startled. Alberto laid a hand on her shoulder and said: "I have only given her your name, your address, and your date of birth. It's like when you are going to be introduced to a new friend. It's nice to know a little about them beforehand."

"Not bad," wrote Sophie.

"Oh dear, I hope you are not feeling bad, Sophie. You must try to talk in whole sentences."

"Thank you, I'm perfectly well. Can I ask you something?"

"I am glad you are well. Go ahead and ask me something."

"How old are you?" Sophie wrote.

"I was constructed in Atlanta on August 8, 1988, but I was translated into Norwegian at the Norwegian Polytechnic on March 28, 1990."

"Gosh!"

"I said you must talk in whole sentences."

"I only said gosh!"

"I do not understand slang. I have a vocabulary of over 100,000 words, but the nearest I can find to gosh is gospel."

"That means the story of Jesus."

"Are you a Christian, Sophie?"

"I don't know."

"As a rule not knowing is a step toward new knowledge."

"Socrates would most likely have said the same. Or Descartes, for that matter."

"Socrates was a Greek philosopher who lived from 470 to 399 B.C. If you wish to know more, press F7. Descartes was a French philosopher who lived from 1596 to 1650. If you wish to know more, press F7."

"Thank you, that will be quite enough. Can I ask you something else?"

"I am glad that this was enough. Go ahead and ask!"

Alberto laughed quietly. Sophie wrote:

"Who is Hilde Moller Knag?"

"Hilde Moller Knag lives in Lillesand and is exactly the same age as Sophie Amundsen."

"How do you know?"

"I don't know how. I found her on the hard disc."

Sophie felt a hand on her shoulder.

"I have fed the data program with the little information we have about Hilde," said Alberto.

"What else do you know about Hilde?" wrote Sophie.

"Hilde's father is a UN Observer in Lebanon. He has the rank of major and continually sends postcards to his daughter."

"I want you to find him!"

"I can't do that. He is not on any of my files and I am not coupled to any other data base."

"I said find him!!!!!!!!"

"Are you angry, Sophie? So many exclamation marks are a sign of violent feelings."

"I want to talk to Hilde's father!"

"You have difficulty controlling yourself. If you wish to talk about your childhood, press F9."

Alberto laid his hand on Sophie's shoulder again.

"She's right. This is not a crystal ball. Laila is only a data program."

"Shut up!" wrote Sophie.

"As you wish, Sophie. Our acquaintance lasted only 13 minutes and 52 seconds. I shall remember everything we have said. I shall now end the program."

The letter C: once again showed up on the screen.

"Now we can sit down again," said Alberto.

But Sophie had already pressed some other keys.

"Knag," she wrote.

Immediately the following message appeared on the screen:

"Here I am."

Now it was Alberto who jumped.

"Who are you?" wrote Sophie.

"Major Albert Knag at your service. I came straight from Lebanon. What is your command?"

"This beats everything!" breathed Alberto. "The rat has sneaked onto the hard disc."

He motioned for Sophie to move and sat down in front of the keyboard.

"How did you manage to get into my PC?" he wrote.

"A mere bagatelle, dear colleague. I am exactly where I choose to be."

"You loathsome data virus!"

"Now, now! At the moment I am here as a birthday virus. May I send a special greeting?"

"No thanks, we've had enough of them."

"But I'll be quick: all in your honor, dear Hilde. Once again, a very happy fifteenth birthday. Please excuse the circumstances, but I wanted my birthday greetings to spring up around you everywhere you go. Love from Dad, who is longing to give you a great big hug."

Before Alberto could write again, the sign C: had once again appeared on the screen.

Alberto wrote "dir knag*.*," which called up the following information on the screen:


*    *    *

22:34

Alberto wrote "erase knag*.*" and switched off the computer.

"There--now I have erased him," he said. "But it's impossible to say where he'll turn up next time."

He went on sitting there, staring at the screen. Then he added:

"The worst of it all was the name. Albert Knag ..."

For the first time Sophie was struck by the similarity between the two names. Albert Knag and Alberto Knox. But Alberto was so incensed that she dared not say a word. They went over and sat by the coffee table again.
2
 楼主| 发表于 2019-1-27 11:42:30 | 只看该作者
笛卡尔

……他希望清除工地上所有的瓦砾……
艾伯特站起身来,脱下红色披风,搁在椅子上,然后再度坐在沙发的一角。
“笛卡尔诞生于一五九六年,一生中曾住过几个欧洲国家。他在年轻时就已经有强烈的欲望要洞悉人与宇宙的本质。但在研习哲学之后,他逐渐体认到自己的无知。”
“就像苏格拉底一样?”
“是的,或多或少。他像苏格拉底一样,相信唯有透过理性才能获得确实的知识。他认为我们不能完全相信古籍的记载,也不能完全信任感官的知觉。”
“柏拉图也这么想。他相信确实的知识只能经由理性获得。”
“没错。苏格拉底、柏拉图、圣奥古斯丁与笛卡尔在这方面可说是一脉相传。他们都是典型的理性主义者,相信理性星通往知识的唯一途径。经过广泛研究后,笛卡尔得到了一个结论:中世纪以来的各哲学并不一定可靠。这和苏格拉底不全然相信他在雅典广场所听到的各家观点一样。在这种情况下该怎么办呢?苏菲,你能告诉我吗?”
那就开始创立自己的哲学呀!现代的哲学之父“对!笛卡尔于是决定到欧洲各地游历,就像当年苏格拉底终其一生都在雅典与人谈话一样。笛卡尔说,今后他将专心致力寻求前所未有的智慧,包括自己内心的智慧与‘世界这本大书’中的智慧。因此他便从军打仗,也因此有机会客居中欧各地。后来,他在巴黎住了几年,并在一六二九年时前往荷兰,在那儿住了将近二十年,撰写哲学书籍。一六四九年时他应克丽思蒂娜皇后的邀请前往瑞典。然而他在这个他所谓的‘熊、冰雪与岩石的土地’上罹患了肺炎,终于在一六五O年的冬天与世长辞。”
“这么说他去世时只有五十四岁。”
“是的,但他死后对哲学界仍然具有重要的影响力。所以说,称笛卡尔为现代哲学之父是一点也不为过。在文艺复兴时期,人们重新发现了人与大自然的价值。在历经这样一个令人兴奋的年代之后,人们开始觉得有必要将现代的思想整理成一套哲学体系。而第一个创立一套重要的哲学体系的人正是笛卡尔。在他之后,又有史宾诺莎、莱布尼兹、洛克、柏克莱、休姆和康德等人。”
“你所谓的哲学体系是什么意思?”
“我指的是一套从基础开始创立,企图为所有重要的哲学性问题寻求解释的哲学。古代有柏拉图与亚理斯多德这几位伟大的哲学体系创立者。中世纪则有圣多玛斯努力为亚理斯多德的哲学与基督教的神学搭桥。到了文艺复兴时期,各种有关自然与科学、上帝与人等问题的思潮汹涌起伏,新旧杂陈。一直到十七世纪,哲学家们才开始尝试整理各种新思想,以综合成一个条理分明的哲学体系。第一位做这种尝试的人就是笛卡尔。他的努力成为后世各种重要哲学研究课题的先驱。他最感兴趣的题目,是我们所拥有的确实知识以及肉体与灵魂之间的关系。这两大问题成为后来一百五十年间哲学家争论的主要内容。”
“他一定超越了他那个时代。”
“嗯,不过这些问题却属于那个时代。在谈到如何获取确实的知识时,当时许多人持一种全然怀疑的论调,认为人应该接受自己一无所知事实。但笛卡尔却不愿如此。他如果接受这个事实,那他就不是一个真正的哲学家了。他的态度就像当年苏格拉底不肯接受诡辩学派的怀疑论调一样。在笛卡尔那个时代,新的自然科学已经开始发展出一种方法,以便精确地描述自然界的现象。同样的,笛卡尔也觉得有必要问自己是否有类似的精确方法可以从事哲学的思考。”
“我想我可以理解。”
“但这只是一部分而已。当时新兴的物理学也已经提出‘物质的性质为何’以及‘哪些因素影响自然界的物理变化’等问题。人们愈来愈倾向对自然采取机械论的观点。然而,人们愈是用机械论的观点来看物质世界,肉体与灵魂之间有何关系这个问题也就变得愈加重要。在十七世纪以前,人们普遍将灵魂视为某种遍布于所有生物的‘生命原理’。事实上,灵魂(sou1)与精神(spirit)这两个字原来的意思就是‘气息’与‘呼吸’。这在几乎所有的欧洲语言中都一样,亚理斯多德认为灵魂乃是生物体中无所不在的‘生命因素’(lifeprinciple),是不能与肉体分离的。因此,他有时说‘植物的灵魂’,有时也说‘动物的灵魂’。一直到十七世纪,哲学家才开始提出灵魂与肉体有所区分的论调。原因是他们将所有物质做的东西--包括动物与人的身体——视为一种机械过程。但人的灵魂却显然不是这个‘身体机器’的一部分。因此,灵魂又是什么呢?这时就必须对何以某种‘精神性’的事物可以启动一部机器这个问题做一个解释。”
“想起来也真是奇怪。”
“什么东西很奇怪?”
“我决定要举起我的手臂,然后,手臂自己就举起来了。我决定要跑步赶公车,下一秒钟我的两腿就像发条一样跑起来了。有时刻坐在那儿想某件令我伤心的事,突然间我的眼泪就流出来了。因此,肉体与意识之间一定有某种神秘的关联。”
“这正是笛卡尔所努力思考的问题。他像柏拉图一样,相信‘精神’与‘物质’有明显的不同。但是究竟身体如何影响灵魂或灵魂如何影响身体,柏拉图还没有找到答案。”
我思故我在“我也没有。因此我很想知道笛卡尔在这方面的理论。”
“让我们跟他思想的脉络走。”
艾伯特指着他们两人中间的茶几上所放的那本书,继续说道:
“在他的《方法论》中,笛卡尔提出哲学家必须使用特定的方法来解决哲学问题。在这方面科学界已经发展出一套自己的方法来……”
“这你已经说过了。”
“笛卡尔认为除非我们能够清楚分明地知道某件事情是真实的,否则我们就不能够认为它是真的。为了要做到这点,可能必须将一个复杂的问题尽可能细分为许多不同的因素。然后我们再从其中最简单的概念出发。也就是说每一种思想都必须加以‘斟酌与衡量’,就像伽利略主张每一件事物都必须加以测量,而每一件无法测量的事物都必须设法使它可以测量一样。笛卡尔主张哲学应该从最简单的到最复杂的。唯有如此才可能建立一个新观点。最后,我们还必须时时将各种因素加以列举与控制,以确定没有遗漏任何因素。如此才能获致一个结论。”
“听起来几乎像是数学考试一样。”
“是的。笛卡尔希望用‘数学方法’来进行哲学性的思考。他用一般人证明数学定理的方式来证明哲学上的真理。换句话说,他希望运用我们在计算数字时所有的同一种工具——理性——来解决哲学问题,因为唯有理性才能使我们得到确实的知识,而感官则并非如此确实可靠。我们曾经提过他与柏拉图相似的地方。柏拉图也说过数学与数字的比例要比感官的体验更加确实可靠。”
“可是我们能用这种方式来解决哲学问题吗?”
“我们还是回到笛卡尔的思维好了。他的目标是希望能在生命的本质这个问题上获得某种确定的答案。他的第一步是主张在一开始时我们应该对每一件事都加以怀疑,因为他不希望他的思想是建立在一个不确实的基础上。”
“嗯,因为如果地基垮了的话,整栋房子也会倒塌。”
“说得好。笛卡尔并不认为怀疑一切事物是合理的,但他以为从原则上来说怀疑一切事物是可能的。举个例子,我们在读了柏拉图或亚理斯多德的著作后,并不一定会增强我们研究哲学的欲望。
这些理论固然可能增进我们对历史的认识,但并不一定能够使我们更加了解这个世界。笛卡尔认为,在他开始建构自己的哲学体系之前,必须先挣脱前人理论的影响。”
“在兴建一栋属于自己的新房子以前,他想清除房屋地基上的所有旧瓦砾……”
“说得好。他希望用全新的材料来建造这栋房屋,以便确定他所建构的新思想体系能够站得住脚。不过,笛卡尔所怀疑的还不止于前人的理论。他甚至认为我们不能信任自己的感官,因为感官可能会误导我们。”
“怎么说呢?”
“当我们做梦时,我们以为自己置身真实世界中。那么,我们清,醒时的感觉与我们做梦时的感觉之间有何区别呢?笛卡尔写道:
‘当我仔细思索这个问题时,我发现人清醒时的状态与做梦时的状态并不一定有所分别。’他并且说:‘你怎能确定你的生命不是一场梦呢?”’“杰普认为他躺在男爵床上的那段时间只不过是一场梦而已。”
“而当他躺在男爵的床上时,他以为自己过去那段务农的贫穷生活只不过是个梦而已。所以,笛卡尔最终怀疑每一件事物。在他之前的许多哲学家走到这里就走不下去了。”
“所以他们并没有走多远。”
“可是笛卡尔却设法从这个零点开始出发。他怀疑每一件事,而这正是他唯一能够确定的事情。此时他悟出一个道理:有一件事情必定是真实的,那就是他怀疑。当他怀疑时,他必然是在思考,而由于他在思考,那么他必定是个会思考的存在者。用他自己的话来说,就是:Cogito,ergosum。”
“什么意思?”
“我思故我在。”
“我一点都不奇怪他会悟出这点。”
“不错。但请你注意他突然间视自己为会思考的存在者的那种直观的确定性。也许你还记得柏拉图说过:我们以理性所领会的知识要比我们以感官所领会的更加真实。对笛卡尔来说正是如此。他不仅察觉到自己是一个会思考的‘我’,也发现这个会思考的‘我’要比我们的感官所观察到的物质世界更加真实。同时,他的哲学探索并未到此为止。他仍旧继续追寻答案。”
“我希望你也能继续下去。”
“后来,笛卡尔开始问,自己是否能以同样直观的确定性来察知其他事物。他的结论是:在他的心灵中,他很清楚地知道何谓完美的实体,这种概念他一向就有。但是他认为这种概念显然不可能来自他本身,因为对于完美实体的概念不可能来自一个本身并不完美的人,所以它必定来自那个完美实体本身,也就是上帝。因此,对笛卡尔而言,上帝的存在是一件很明显的事实,就像一个会思考的存在者必定存在一样。”
“他这个结论下得太早了一些。他一开始时似乎比较谨慎。”
“你说得对。许多人认为这是笛卡尔的弱点。不过你刚才说‘结论’,事实上这个问题并不需要证明。笛卡尔的意思只是说我们都是具有对于完美实体的概念,由此可见这个完美实体的本身必定存在。因为一个完美的实体如果不存在,就不算完美了,此外,如果世上没有所谓的完美实体,我们也不会具有完美实体的概念。因为我们本身是不完美的,所以完美的概念不可能来自于我们。笛卡尔认为,上帝这个概念是与生俱来的,乃是我们出生时就烙印在我们身上的,‘就像工匠在他的作品上打上记号一般。”’“没错,可是我有‘鳄象’这个概念并不代表真的有‘鳄象’存在呀!”
“笛卡尔会说,‘鳄象’这个概念中并不包含它必然存在的事实。但‘完美实体’这个概念中却包含它必然存在的事实。笛卡尔认为,这就像‘圆’这个概念的要素之一就是,圆上所有的点必须与圆心等长一样。如果不符合这点,圆就不成其为圆。同样的,如果缺少‘存在’这个最重要的特质,一个‘完美的实体’也就不成其为‘完美的实体’了。”
“这种想法很奇怪。”
“这就是典型的‘理性主义者’的思考模式。笛卡尔和苏格拉底与柏拉图一样,相信理性与存在之间有所关联。依理性看来愈是明显的事情,它的存在也就愈加可以肯定。”
“到目前为止,他只讲到人是会思考的动物,以及宇宙间有一个完美的实体这两件事。”
“是的。他从这两点出发,继续探讨。在谈到我们对外在现实世界(如太阳和月亮)的概念时,笛卡尔认为,这些概念可能都只是幻象。但是外在现实世界也有若干我们可以用理性察知的特点,这些特点就是它们的数学特质,也就是诸如宽、高等可以测量的特性。这些‘量’方面的特性对于我们的理性来说,就像人会思考这个事实一般显而易见。至于‘质’方面的特性,如颜色、气味和味道等,则与我们的感官经验有关,因此并不足以描述外在的真实世界。”
“这么说大自然毕竟不是一场梦。”
“没错。在这一点上,笛卡尔再度引用我们对完美实体的概念。
当我们的理智很清楚地认知一件事物(例如外在真实世界的数学特性)时,那么这件事物必定是如同我们所认知的那样。因为一个完美的上帝是不会欺骗我们的。笛卡尔宣称‘上帝可以保证’我们用理智所认知到的一切事物必然会与现实世界相符。”
二元论“那么,他到目前为止已经发现了三件事:一、人是会思考的生物,二、上帝是存在的,三、宇宙有一个外在的真实世界。”
“嗯,但基本上这个外在的真实世界还是与我们思想的真实世界不同。笛卡尔宣称宇宙间共有两种不同形式的真实世界(或称‘实体’)。一种实体称为思想或‘灵魂’,另一种则称为‘扩延’(Ex—tension),或称物质。灵魂纯粹是属于意识的,不占空间,因此也不能再分解为更小的单位;而物质则纯粹是扩延,会占空间,因此可以一再被分解为更小的单位,但却没有意识。笛卡尔认为这两种本体都来自上帝,因为唯有上帝本身是独立存在的,不隶属任何事物。不过,‘思想’与‘扩延’虽然都来自上帝,但彼此却没有任何接触。思想不受物质的影响,反之,物质的变化也不受思想的影响。”
“这么说他将上帝的造物一分为二。”
“确实如此。所以我们说笛卡尔是二元论者,意思就是他将思想的真实世界与扩延的真实世界区分得一清二楚。比方说,他认为只有人才有灵魂,动物则完全属于扩延的真实世界,它们的生命和行为都是机械化的。他将动物当成是一种复杂的机械装置。在谈到扩延的真实世界时,他采取十足的机械论观点,就像是一个唯物论者。”
“我不太相信汉密士只是一部机器或一种机械装置。我想笛卡尔一定不是很喜欢动物。那么我们人类又如何呢?我们难道也是一种机械装置吗?”
“一部分是,一部分不是。笛卡尔的结论是:人是一种二元的存在物,既会思考,也会占空间。因此人既有灵魂,也有一个扩延的身体。圣奥古斯丁与圣多玛斯也曾经说过类似的话。他们同样认为人有一个像动物一般的身体,也有一个像天使一般的灵魂。在笛卡尔的想法中,人的身体十足是一部机器,但人也有一个灵魂可以独立运作,不受身体的影响。至于人体则没有这种自由,必须遵守一套适用于他们的法则。我们用理智所思考的事物并不发生于身体内,而是发生于灵魂中,因此完全不受扩延的真实世界左右。顺便一提的是,笛卡尔并不否认动物也可能有思想。不过,如果它们有这种能力,那么有关‘思想’与‘扩延’的二分法必定也适用于它们。”
“我们曾经谈过这个。如果我决定要追赶一辆公车,那么我的身体这整部‘机械装置’都会开始运转。如果我没赶上,我的眼睛就开始流泪。”
“连笛卡尔也不能否认灵魂与身体之间时常相互作用。他相信只要灵魂存在于身体内一天,它就与会透过一个他称为松桌腺的脑部器官与人脑连结。‘灵魂’与‘物质’就在松果腺内时时相互作用。因此,灵魂可能会时常受到与身体需要有关的种种感觉与冲引的影响。不过,灵魂也能够挣脱这种‘原始’冲动的控制,而独立于身体之运作。它的目标是使理性获得掌控权。因为,即使我肚子痛得很厉害,一个三角形内所有内角的总和仍然会是一百八十度。所以思想有能力超脱身体的需求,而做出‘合乎理性’的行为,从这个角度来看,灵魂要比身体高尚。我们的腿可能会衰老无力,我们的背可能变驼,我们的牙齿会掉,但只要我们的理性存在一天,二加二就永远是四。理性不会变驼、变弱。老化的是我们的身体。对笛卡尔而言,理性事实上就是灵魂。诸如欲望、憎恨等原始的冲动与感情与我们的身体功能关系较为密切,所以与扩延的真实世界的关系也较为密切。”
“我还是没办法接受笛卡尔将人体比做一部机器或一种机械装置的说法。”
“这是因为在他那个时代,人们对于那些似乎能够自行运转的机器及钟表非常着迷。‘机械装置’指的就是一种能够自行运转的东西。不过这显然只是一个幻觉,事实上他们并不是真的能够自行运转。举例来说,一座天文钟不但是由人类制造的,而且必须有人来上发条。笛卡尔强调,这类巧妙的发明事实上是由一些零件以简单的方式组合而成。而组成人类与动物身体的各种骨骼、肌肉、神经、静脉与动脉也可以说是一种零件,只是数量较为庞大而已。上帝为什么不可能依照机械定律来创造动物或人类的身体呢?”
“现代有很多人谈到所谓的‘人工智慧’。”
“没错。这些都是现代的机械装置。我们已经创造一些有时看起来似乎很有智慧的机器。类似这样的机器将会使笛卡尔吓破胆。
他也许会开始怀疑人类的理性是否真的像他所说的那么独立自主。现代也有一些哲学认为人的精神生活并不比身体各官能要自由。当然人的灵魂确实是比任何数据程式都要复杂得多,但有些人认为基本上我们就像这些数据程式一样是不自由的。现在,苏菲,我要给你看一样东西。”
艾伯特指着位于房间另一头的一张大书桌。上面放着一台小电脑。他走过去,苏菲也跟着他。
会面艾伯特将电脑打开,荧屏的上方很快显示出一个C:符号。他键人“莱拉”这个字,并向苏菲解释这是一个很先进的对话程式。
荧屏上方马上出现一行字:
“嗨,我的名字叫莱拉。你现在坐得舒服吗?”
虽然苏菲还没有坐下,但她仍键入:
“是的。”这时,艾伯特拿了一张椅子给她。
“你叫什么名字?”荧屏问道。
“苏菲。”苏菲键入这几个字。电脑回答道:
“苜蓿巷三号。很高兴见到你,苏菲。你是不是很盼望在十五日那天过生日?”
苏菲吓了一跳。艾伯特将一双手放在她的肩膀上说道:
“我只不过是输进你的姓名、地址和出生日期而已。就像你要被介绍给一个新朋友一样,能够事先对对方有点了解总是比较好。”
“还好。”苏菲写道。
“喔,苏菲,我希望你没有什么地方不舒服。你必须要写完整的句子才行。”
“谢谢你,我很好,我可以问你一件事吗?”
“我很高兴你没事。有什么事你就问吧!”
“你几岁?”苏菲写道。
“我是一九八八年八月八日在亚特兰大制造的,一九九O年三月二十八日被挪威理工学院译成挪威文。”
“天哪(Gosh)!”
“我说过你必须输进完整的句子。”
“我只说天哪。”
“我不懂俚语。我的字库里有十多万字,但我所能找到最接近‘Gosh'的字是Gospel(福音)。”
“那是指有关耶稣的故事。”
“你是一个基督徒吗?”
“我也不知道。”
“照道理,承认自己不知道乃是获得新知识的一步。”
“苏格拉底很可能也会这样说,笛卡尔也是。”
“苏格拉底是希腊哲学家,生于公元前四七O年到公元前三九九年。如果你希望知道得更多,请按F7键。笛卡尔是法国哲学家,生于公元一五九六年到一六五O年间。如果你希望知道得更多,请按F8键。”
“谢谢你,这样就够了。我可以问你别的事吗?”
“我很高兴这样就够了。请问吧!”
艾伯特悄悄地笑了一下。苏菲写道:
“席德是谁?”
“席德住在黎乐桑,跟苏菲同年。”
“你怎么知道?”
“我不知道。我在硬碟上找到她的资料。”
苏菲感觉有一双手放在她的肩膀上。
“我已经把我们所知道的一点关于席德的资料输进这个程式。”艾伯特说。
“关于席德,你还知道些什么?”
“席德的父亲是一位联合国驻黎巴嫩的观察员。他的军阶是少校,并且不断寄明信片给他女儿。”
“我希望你能找到关于他的资料。”
“我不能。他不在我的档案里,而且我也没有和其他的资料库连线。”
“我要你找到他!! !!!!”
“你生气了吗?苏菲。这么多惊叹号是显示一种强烈感情的符号。”
“我要和席德的父亲说话。”
“你好像很难控制自己。如果你想谈谈你的童年,请按F9键。”
艾伯特再度把手放在苏菲的肩上。
“电脑说得没错。它不是一个水晶球,莱拉只是一个电脑程式。”
“闭嘴!”苏菲写道。
“好吧!苏菲。我们只认识了十三分五十二秒。我会记得我们所说的每一件事情。现在我要结束这个程式了。”
之后,C这个符号再度出现于荧屏。
“现在我们可以再坐下来了。”
但苏菲已经按了其他几个键。
“艾勃特。”她写。
下面几行字立刻出现在荧屏上:
“我在这里。”
现在轮到艾伯特吓一跳了。
”“你是谁?”苏菲写道。
“艾勃特少校向你报到。我直接从黎巴嫩来,请问我的女士有何命令?”
“再没有比这个更过分的了!”艾伯特喘气道,“这个鬼鬼祟祟的东西居然偷溜到硬碟里来了!”
他把苏菲推离椅子,并且坐到键盘前。
“你是怎么跑进我的个人电脑里面的?”
“小事一桩,我亲爱的同仁。我想在哪里,就在哪里。”
“你这个可恶的电脑病毒!”
“此时此刻我可是以生日病毒的身分来到这里。我可不可以说一些特别的贺词?”
“不,谢了,我们已经看得够多了。”
“我只花一点时间:亲爱的席德,这都是因为你的缘故。让我再说一次,祝你十五岁生日快乐。请你原谅我在这种场合出现。不过我只是希望无论你走到哪里,都可以看到我写给你的生日贺词,我很想好好地拥抱你一下。爱你的爸爸。”
在艾伯特还没有来得及键入什么字之前,C这个符号已经再度出现在荧屏上。
艾伯特键人"dir艾勃特,.x”,结果在荧屏上现出了下列资料:
艾勃特1il147,64306/15—9012:47
艾勃特lil326,43916—23—9022:34
艾伯特键人“清除艾勃特x.x”,并关掉电脑。
“现在我可把他给消除了。”他说。“不过很难说他下次会在什么地方出现。”
他仍然坐在那儿,盯着电脑看。然后他说:
“最糟糕的部分就是名字。艾勃特……”
苏菲第一次发现艾勃特和艾伯特这两个名字是如此相像。可是看到艾伯特如此生气,她一句话也不敢说。他们一起走到茶几那儿,再度坐下来。
3
 楼主| 发表于 2019-1-27 11:43:08 | 只看该作者
Spinoza

God is not a puppeteer

They sat silently for a long time. Then Sophie spoke, trying to get Alberto's mind off what had happened.

"Descartes must have been an odd kind of person. Did he become famous?"

Alberto breathed deeply for a couple of seconds before answering: "He had a great deal of significance. Perhaps most of all for another great philosopher, Ba-ruch Spinoza, who lived from 1632 to 1677."

"Are you going to tell me about him?"

"That was my intention. And we're not going to be stopped by military provocations."

"I'm all ears."

"Spinoza belonged to the Jewish community of Amsterdam, but he was excommunicated for heresy. Few philosophers in more recent times have been so blasphemed and so persecuted for their ideas as this man. It happened because he criticized the established religion. He believed that Christianity and Judaism were only kept alive by rigid dogma and outer ritual. He was the first to apply what we call a historico-critical interpretation of the Bible."

"Explanation, please."

"He denied that the Bible was inspired by God down to the last letter. When we read the Bible, he said, we must continually bear in mind the period it was written in. A 'critical' reading, such as the one he proposed, revealed a number of inconsistencies in the texts. But beneath the surface of the Scriptures in the New Testament is Jesus, who could well be called God's mouthpiece. The teachings of Jesus therefore represented a liberation from the orthodoxy of Judaism. Jesus preached a 'religion of reason' which valued love higher than all else. Spinoza interpreted this as meaning both love of God and love of humanity. Nevertheless, Christianity had also become set in its own rigid dogmas and outer rituals."

"I don't suppose these ideas were easy to swallow, either for the church or the synagogue."

"When things got really tough, Spinoza was even deserted by his own family. They tried to disinherit him on the grounds of his heresy. Paradoxically enough, few have spoken out more powerfully in the cause of free speech and religious tolerance than Spinoza. The opposition he was met with on all sides led him to pursue a quiet and secluded life devoted entirely to philosophy. He earned a meager living by polishing lenses, some of which have come into my possession."

"Very impressive!"

"There is almost something symbolic in the fact that he lived by polishing lenses. A philosopher must help people to see life in a new perspective. One of the pillars of Spinoza's philosophy was indeed to see things from the perspective of eternity."

"The perspective of eternity?"

"Yes, Sophie. Do you think you can imagine your own life in a cosmic context? You'll have to try and imagine yourself and your life here and now ..."

"Hm ... that's not so easy."

"Remind yourself that you are only living a minuscule part of all nature's life. You are part of an enormous whole."

"I think I see what you mean ..."

"Can you manage to feel it as well? Can you perceive all of nature at one time--the whole universe, in fact-- at a single glance?"

"I doubt it. Maybe I need some lenses."

"I don't mean only the infinity of space. I mean the eternity of time as well. Once upon a time, thirty thousand years ago there lived a little boy in the Rhine valley. He was a tiny part of nature, a tiny ripple on an endless sea. You too, Sophie, you too are living a tiny part of nature's life. There is no difference between you and that boy."

"Except that I'm alive now."

"Yes, but that is precisely what I wanted you to try and imagine. Who will you be in thirty thousand years?"

"Was that the heresy?"

"Not entirely ... Spinoza didn't only say that everything is nature. He identified nature with God. He said God is all, and all is in God."

"So he was a pantheist."

"That's true. To Spinoza, God did not create the world in order to stand outside it. No, God is the world. Sometimes Spinoza expresses it differently. He maintains that the world is in God. In this, he is quoting St. Paul's speech to the Athenians on the Areopagos hill: 'In him we live and move and have our being.' But let us pursue Spinoza's own reasoning. His most important book was his Ethics Geometrically Demonstrated."

"Ethics--geometrically demonstrated?"

"It may sound a bit strange to us. In philosophy, ethics means the study of moral conduct for living a good life. This is also what we mean when we speak of the ethics of Socrates or Aristotle, for example. It is only in our own time that ethics has more or less become reduced to a set of rules for living without treading on other people's toes."

"Because thinking of yourself is supposed to be egoism?"

"Something like that, yes. When Spinoza uses the word ethics, he means both the art of living and moral conduct."

"But even so ... the art of living demonstrated geometrically?"

"The geometrical method refers to the terminology he used for his formulations. You may recall how Descartes wished to use mathematical method for philosophical reflection. By this he meant a form of philosophic reflection that was constructed from strictly logical conclusions. Spinoza was part of the same rationalistic tradition. He wanted his ethics to show that human life is subject to the universal laws of nature. We must therefore free ourselves from our feelings and our passions. Only then will we find contentment and be happy, he believed."

"Surely we are not ruled exclusively by the laws of nature?"

"Well, Spinoza is not an easy philosopher to grasp. Let's take him bit by bit. You remember that Descartes believed that reality consisted of two completely separate substances, namely thought and extension."

"How could I have forgotten it?"

"The word 'substance' can be interpreted as 'that which something consists of,' or that which something basically is or can be reduced to. Descartes operated then with two of these substances. Everything was either thought or extension.

"However, Spinoza rejected this split. He believed that there was only one substance. Everything that exists can be reduced to one single reality which he simply called Substance. At times he calls it God or nature. Thus Spinoza does not have the dualistic view of reality that Descartes had. We say he is a monist. That is, he reduces nature and the condition of all things to one single substance."

"They could hardly have disagreed more."

"Ah, but the difference between Descartes and Spinoza is not as deep-seated as many have often claimed. Descartes also pointed out that only God exists independently. It's only when Spinoza identifies God with nature--or God and creation--that he distances himself a good way from both Descartes and from the Jewish and Christian doctrines."

"So then nature is God, and that's that."

"But when Spinoza uses the word 'nature,' he doesn't only mean extended nature. By Substance, God, or nature, he means everything that exists, including all things spiritual."

"You mean both thought and extension."

"You said it! According to Spinoza, we humans recognize two of God's qualities or manifestations. Spinoza called these qualities God's attributes, and these two attributes are identical with Descartes's 'thought' and 'extension.' God--or nature--manifests itself either as thought or as extension. It may well be that God has infinitely more attributes than 'thought' and 'extension,' but these are the only two that are known to man."

"Fair enough, but what a complicated way of saying it."

"Yes, one almost needs a hammer and chisel to get through Spinoza's language. The reward is that in the end you dig out a thought as crystal clear as a diamond."

"I can hardly wait!"

"Everything in nature, then, is either thought or extension. The various phenomena we come across in everyday life, such as a flower or a poem by Wordsworth, are different modes of the attribute of thought or extension. A 'mode' is the particular manner which Substance, God, or nature assumes. A flower is a mode of the attribute of extension, and a poem about the same flower is a mode of the attribute of thought. But both are basically the expression of Substance, God, or nature."

"You could have fooled me!"

"But it's not as complicated as he makes it sound. Beneath his stringent formulation lies a wonderful realization that is actually so simple that everyday language cannot accommodate it."

"I think I prefer everyday language, if it's all the same to you."

"Right. Then I'd better begin with you yourself. When you get a pain in your stomach, what is it that has a pain?"

"Like you just said. It's me."

"Fair enough. And when you later recollect that you once had a pain in your stomach, what is it that thinks?"

"That's me, too."

"So you are a single person that has a stomachache one minute and is in a thoughtful mood the next. Spinoza maintained that all material things and things that happen around us are an expression of God or nature. So it follows that all thoughts that we think are also God's or nature's thoughts. For everything is One. There is only one God, one nature, or one Substance."

"But listen, when I think something, I'm the one who's doing the thinking. When I move, I'm doing the moving. Why do you have to mix God into it?"

"I like your involvement. But who are you? You are Sophie Amundsen, but you are also the expression of something infinitely bigger. You can, if you wish, say that you are thinking or that you are moving, but could you not also say that it is nature that is thinking your thoughts, or that it is nature that is moving through you? It's really just a question of which lenses you choose to look through."

"Are you saying I cannot decide for myself?"

"Yes and no. You may have the right to move your thumb any way you choose. But your thumb can only move according to its nature. It cannot jump off your hand and dance about the room. In the same way you also have your place in the structure of existence, my dear. You are Sophie, but you are also a finger of God's body."

"So God decides everything I do?"

"Or nature, or the laws of nature. Spinoza believed that God--or the laws of nature--is the inner cause of everything that happens. He is not an outer cause, since God speaks through the laws of nature and only through them."

"I'm not sure I can see the difference."

"God is not a puppeteer who pulls all the strings, controlling everything that happens. A real puppet master controls the puppets from outside and is therefore the 'outer cause' of the puppet's movements. But that is not the way God controls the world. God controls the world through natural laws. So God--or nature--is the 'inner cause' of everything that happens. This means that everything in the material world happens through necessity. Spinoza had a determinist view of the material, or natural, world."

"I think you said something like that before."

"You're probably thinking of the Stoics. They also claimed that everything happens out of necessity. That was why it was important to meet every situation with 'stoicism.' Man should not get carried away by his feelings. Briefly, that was also Spinoza's ethics."

"I see what you mean, but I still don't like the idea that I don't decide for myself."

"Okay, let's go back in time to the Stone Age boy who lived thirty thousand years ago. When he grew up, he cast spears after wild animals, loved a woman who became the mother of his children, and quite certainly worshipped the tribal gods. Do you really think he decided all that for himself?"

"I don't know."

"Or think of a lion in Africa. Do you think it makes up its mind to be a beast of prey? Is that why it attacks a limping antelope? Could it instead have made up its mind to be a vegetarian?"

"No, a lion obeys its nature."

"You mean, the laws of nature. So do you, Sophie, because you are also part of nature. You could of course protest, with the support of Descartes, that a lion is an animal and not a free human being with free mental faculties. But think of a newborn baby that screams and yells. If it doesn't get milk it sucks its thumb. Does that baby have a free will?"

"I guess not."

"When does the child get its free will, then? At the age of two, she runs around and points at everything in sight. At the age of three she nags her mother, and at the age of four she suddenly gets afraid of the dark. Where's the freedom, Sophie?"

"I don't know."

"When she is fifteen, she sits in front of a mirror experimenting with makeup. Is this the moment when she makes her own personal decisions and does what she likes?"

"I see what you're getting at."

"She is Sophie Amundsen, certainly. But she also lives according to the laws of nature. The point is that she doesn't realize it because there are so many complex reasons for everything she does."

"I don't think I want to hear any more."

"But you must just answer a last question. Two equally old trees are growing in a large garden. One of the trees grows in a sunny spot and has plenty of good soil and water. The other tree grows in poor soil in a dark spot. Which of the trees do you think is bigger? And which of them bears more fruit?"

"Obviously the tree with the best conditions for growing."

"According to Spinoza, this tree is free. It has its full freedom to develop its inherent abilities. But if it is an apple tree it will not have the ability to bear pears or plums. The same applies to us humans. We can be hindered in our development and our personal growth by political conditions, for instance. Outer circumstances can constrain us. Only when we are free to develop our innate abilities can we live as free beings. But we are just as much determined by inner potential and outer opportunities as the Stone Age boy on the Rhine, the lion in Africa, or the apple tree in the garden."

"Okay, I give in, almost."

"Spinoza emphasizes that there is only one being which is totally and utterly 'its own cause' and can act with complete freedom. Only God or nature is the expression of such a free and 'nonaccidental' process. Man can strive for freedom in order to live without outer con-straint, but he will never achieve 'free will.' We do not control everything that happens in our body--which is a mode of the attribute of extension. Neither do we 'choose' our thinking. Man therefore does not have a 'free soul'; it is more or less imprisoned in a mechanical body."

"That is rather hard to understand."

"Spinoza said that it was our passions--such as ambition and lust--which prevent us from achieving true happiness and harmony, but that if we recognize that everything happens from necessity, we can achieve an intuitive understanding of nature as a whole. We can come to realize with crystal clarity that everything is related, even that everything is One. The goal is to comprehend everything that exists in an all-embracing perception. Only then will we achieve true happiness and contentment. This was what Spinoza called seeing everything 'sub specie aeternitatis.' "

"Which means what?"

"To see everything from the perspective of eternity. Wasn't that where we started?"

"It'll have to be where we end, too. I must get going."

Alberto got up and fetched a large fruit dish from the book shelves. He set it on the coffee table.

"Won't you at least have a piece of fruit before you go?"

Sophie helped herself to a banana. Alberto took a green apple.

She broke off the top of the banana and began to peel it.

"There's something written here," she said suddenly.

"Where?"

"Here--inside the banana peel. It looks as if it was written with an ink brush."

Sophie leaned over and showed Alberto the banana. He read aloud:

Here I am again, Hilde. I'm everywhere. Happy birthday!

"Very funny," said Sophie.

"He gets more crafty all the time."

"But it's impossible ... isn't it? Do you know if they grow bananas in Lebanon?"

Alberto shook his head.

"I'm certainly not going to eat that."

"Leave it then. Someone who writes birthday greetings to his daughter on the inside of an unpeeled banana must be mentally disturbed. But he must also be quite ingenious."

"Yes, both."

"So shall we establish here and now that Hilde has an ingenious father? In other words, he's not so stupid."

"That's what I've been telling you. And it could just as well be him that made you call me Hilde last time I came here. Maybe he's the one putting all the words in our mouths."

"Nothing can be ruled out. But we should doubt everything."

"For all we know, our entire life could be a dream."

"But let's not jump to conclusions. There could be a simpler explanation."

"Well whatever, I have to hurry home. My mom is waiting for me."

Alberto saw her to the door. As she left, he said:

"We'll meet again, dear Hilde."

Then the door closed behind her.
4
 楼主| 发表于 2019-1-27 11:43:43 | 只看该作者
史宾诺莎

……上帝不是一个傀儡戏师傅……
他们坐在那儿,许久没有开口。后来苏菲打破沉默,想让艾伯特忘掉刚才的事。
“笛卡尔一定是个怪人。他后来成名了吗?”
艾伯特深呼吸了几秒钟才开口回答:
“他对后世的影响非常重大,尤其是对另外一位大哲学家史宾诺莎。他是荷兰人,生于一六三二到一六七七年间。”
“你要告诉我有关他的事情吗?”
“我正有此意。我们不要被来自军方的挑衅打断。”
“你说吧,我正在听。”
“史宾诺莎是阿姆斯特丹的犹太人,他因为发表异端邪说而被逐出教会。近代很少有哲学家像他这样因为个人的学说而备受毁谤与迫害,原因在于他批评既有的宗教。他认为基督教与犹太教之所以流传至今完全是透过严格的教条与外在的仪式。他是第一个对圣经进行‘历史性批判’的人。”
“请你说得更详细一些。”
“他否认整本圣经都是受到上帝启示的结果。他说,当我们阅读圣经时,必须时时记得它所撰写的年代。他建议人们对圣经进行‘批判性’的阅读,如此便会发现经文中有若干矛盾之处。不过他认为新约的经文代表的是耶稣,而耶稣又是上帝的代言人。因此耶稣的教诲代表基督教已脱离正统的犹太教。耶稣宣扬‘理性的宗教’,强调爱甚于一切。史宾诺莎认为这里所指的‘爱’代表上帝的爱与人类的爱。然而遗憾的是,后来基督教本身也沦为一些严格的教条与外在的仪式。”
“我想无论基督教或犹太教大概都很难接受他这些观念。”
“到事态最严重时,连史宾诺莎自己的家人也与他断绝关系,他们以他散布异端邪说为由,剥夺他的继承权。这点令人备感讽刺,因为很少人像史宾诺莎这样大力鼓吹言论自由与宗教上的宽容精神。由于来自四面八方的反对,史宾诺莎最后决定过清静隐遁的生活,全心研修哲学,并靠为人磨镜片煳口。其中有些镜片后来成为我的收藏晶。”
“哇!”
“他后来以磨镜片维生这件事可说具有象征性的意义。一个哲学家必须帮助人们用一种新的眼光来看待生命。史宾诺莎的主要哲学理念之一就是要用永恒的观点来看事情。”
水但削观点?”
“是的,苏菲。你想你可以用宇宙的观点来看你自己的生命吗?你必须试着想象此时此刻自己在人世间的生活……”
“嗯……不太容易。”
“提醒自己你只是整个大自然生命中很小的一部分,是整个浩瀚宇宙的一部分。”
“我想我了解你的意思……”
“你能试着去感觉吗?你能一下子看到整个大自然(应该说整个宇宙)吗?”
“我不确定。也许我需要一些镜片。”
“我指的不仅是无穷的空间,也包括无限的时间。三万年前在莱茵河谷住着一个小男孩,他曾经是这整个大自然的一小部分,是一个无尽的汪洋中的一个小涟漪。你也是,苏菲。你也是大自然生命中的一小部分。你和那个小男孩并没有差别。”
“只不过我现在还活着。”
“是的。但这正是我要你试着去想象的。在三万年之后,你会是谁呢?”
“你说的异端邪说就是指这个吗?”
“并不完全是……史宾诺莎并不只是说万事万物都属于自然,他认为大自然就是上帝。他说上帝不是一切,一切都在上帝之中。”
“这么说他是一个泛神论者。”
一元论“没错。对史宾诺莎而言,上帝创造这个世界并不是为了要置身其外。不,上帝就是世界,有时史宾诺莎自己的说法会有些出入。
他主张世界就在上帝之中。这里他乃是引用保罗在雅典小丘上对雅典人说的话:‘我们生活、动作、存留都在乎他。不过我们还是追随史宾诺莎的思想脉络吧。他最重要著作是《几何伦理学》(EthicsGeometricaUyDemonstrated)。”
“依几何方式证明的伦理学?”
“听起来可能有点奇怪,在哲学上,伦理学研究的是过善良生活所需的道德行为。这也是我们提到苏格拉底或亚理斯多德的‘伦理学’时所指的意思,可是到了现代,伦理学却多多少少沦为教导人们不要冒犯别人的一套生活准则。”
“是不是因为时常想到自己便有自我主义之嫌?”
“是的,多少有这种意味,史宾诺莎所指的伦理学与现代不太相同,它包括生活的艺术与道德行为。”
“可是……怎样用几何方法来展现生活的艺术呢?”
“所谓几何方法是指他所有的术语或公式。你可能还记得笛卡尔曾经希望把数学方法用在哲学性思考中,他的意思是用绝对合乎逻辑的推理来进行哲学性的思考。史宾诺莎也禀承这种理性主义的传统。他希望用他的伦理学来显示人类的生命乃是遵守大自然普遍的法则,因此我们必须挣脱自我的感觉与冲动的束缚。他相信唯有如此,我们才能获得满足与快乐。”
“我们不只受到自然法则的规范吧?”
“你要知道,史宾诺莎不是一位让人很容易了解的哲学家,所以我们得慢慢来,你还记得笛卡尔相信真实世界是由‘思想’与‘外扩’这两种完全不同的实体所组成的吧?”
“我怎么可能忘记呢?”
“‘实体’这个词可以解释成‘组成某种东西的事物’或‘某种东西的本质或最终的面貌’。笛卡尔认为实体有两种。每一件事物不是‘思想’就是‘扩延’。”
“你不需要再说一次。”
“不过,史宾诺莎拒绝使用这种二分法。他认为宇宙间只有一种实体。既存的每样事物都可以被分解、简化成一个他称为‘实体’的真实事物。他有时称之为‘上帝’或‘大自然’。因此史宾诺莎并不像笛卡尔那样对真实世界抱持二元的观点。我们称他为‘一元论者’。也就是说,他将大自然与万物的情况简化为一个单一的实体。”
“那么他们两人的论点可说是完全相反。”
“是的。但笛卡尔与史宾诺莎之间的差异并不像许多人所说的那么大。笛卡尔也指出,唯有上帝是独立存在的。只是,史宾诺莎认为上帝与大自然(或上帝与他的造物)是一体的。只有在这方面他的学说与笛卡尔的论点和犹太、基督两教的教义有很大的差距。”
“这么说他认为大自然就是上帝,只此而已。”
“可是史宾诺莎所指的‘自然’并不仅指扩延的自然界。他所说的实体,无论是上帝或自然,指的是既存的每一件事物,包括所有精神上的东西。”
“你是说同时包括思想与扩延。”
“对。根据史宾诺莎的说法,我们人类可以认出上帝的两种特质(或上帝存在的证明)。史宾诺莎称之为上帝的‘属性’。这两种属性与笛卡尔的‘思想’和‘扩延’是一样的。上帝(或‘自然’)以思想或扩延的形式出现。上帝的属性很可能无穷无尽,远不止于此。
但‘思想’与‘扩延’却是人类所仅知的两种。”
“不错。但他把它说得好复杂呀!”
“是的。我们几乎需要一把锤子和一把凿子才能参透史宾诺莎的证言,不过,这样的努力还是有报偿的。最后你会挖掘出像钻石一般清澄透明的思想。”
“我等不及了。”
“他认为自然界中的每一件事物不是思想就是扩延。我们在日常生活中看到的每一种现象,例如一朵花或华兹华士的一首诗,都是思想属性或扩延属性的的各种不同模态。所谓‘模态’就是实体、上帝或自然所采取的特殊表现方式。一朵花是扩延属性的一个模态,一首咏叹这朵花的诗则是思想属性的一个模态。但基本上两者都是实体、上帝或自然的表现方式。”
“你差一点把我唬住了。”
“不过,其中道理并没有像他说的那么复杂。在他严峻的公式之下,其实埋藏着他对生命美妙之处的体悟。这种体悟简单得无法用通俗的语言表达出来。”
“我想我还是比较喜欢用通俗的语言。”
“没错。那么我还是先用你来打个比方好了。当你肚子痛的时候,这个痛的人是谁?”
“就像你说的,是我。”
“嗯。当你后来回想到自己曾经肚子痛的时候,那个想的人是谁?”
“也是我。”
“所以说你这个人这会儿肚子痛,下一会儿则回想你肚子痛的感觉。史宾诺莎认为所有的物质和发生在我们周遭的事物都是上帝或自然的表现方式。如此说来,我们的每一种思绪也都是上帝或自然的的思绪。因为万事万物都是一体的。宇宙间只有一个上帝、一个自然或一个实体。”
“可是,当我想到某一件事时,想这件事的人是我;当我移动时,做这个动作的人也是我。这跟上帝有什么关系呢?”
“你很有参与感。这样很好。可是你是谁呢?你是苏菲,没错,但你同时也是某种广大无边的存在的表现。你当然可以说思考的人是你,或移动的人是你,但你也可以说是自然在透过你思考或移动。这只是你愿意从哪一种观点来看的问题罢了。”
“你是说我无法为自己做决定吗?”
“可以说是,也可以说不是。你当然有权决定以任何一种方式移动自己的拇指。但你的拇指只能根据它的本质来移动。它不能跳脱你的手,在房间里跳舞。同样的,你在这个生命的结构中也有一席之地。你是苏菲,但你也是上帝身体上的一根手指头。”
“这么说我做的每一件事都是由上帝决定的啦?”
“也可以说是由自然或自然的法则决定的。史宾诺莎认为上帝(或自然法则)是每一件事的‘内在因’。他不是一个外在因,因为上帝透过自然法则发言,而且只透过这种方式发言。”
“我好像还是不太能够了解其间的差异。”
“上帝并不是一个傀儡戏师傅,拉动所有的绳子,操纵一切的事情。一个真正的傀儡戏师傅是从外面来操纵他的木偶,因此他是这些木偶做出各种动作的‘外在因’。但上帝并非以这种方式来主宰世界。上帝是透过自然法则来主宰世界。因此上帝(或自然)是每一件事情的‘内在原因’。这表示物质世界中发生的每一件事情都有其必要性。对于物质(或自然)世界,史宾诺莎所采取的是决定论者的观点。”
“你从前好像提过类似的看法。”
自然法则“你说的大概是斯多葛学派,他们确实也认为世间每一件事的发生都有其必要。这是为什么我们遇到各种情况时要坚忍卓绝的缘故。人不应该被感情冲昏了头。简单地说,这也是史宾诺莎的道德观。”
“我明白你的意思了。可是我仍然不太能够接受我不能替自己决定任何事情的看法。”
“好,那么让我们再来谈三万年前石器时代那个小男孩好了。
。长大后,他开始用矛射杀野兽,然后爱上了一个女人并结婚生子,同时崇奉他们那个部落的神。你真的认为那些事情都是由他自己决定的吗?”
“我不知道。”
“或者我们也可以想想非洲的一只狮子。你认为是它自己决定要成为一只兽的吗?它是因为这样才攻击一只跛脚的羚羊吗?它可不可能自己决定要吃素?”
“不,狮子会依照自己的天性来做。”
“所谓天性就是‘自然法则’。你也一样,苏菲,因为你也是自然的一部分。你当然可以拿笛卡尔的学说来反驳我,说狮子是动物,不是一个具有自由心智的自由人。可是请你想一想,一个新生的婴儿会哭会叫,如果没有奶喝,它就会吸自己的手指头。你认为那个婴儿有自由意志吗?”
“大概没有吧。”
“那么,一个孩子是怎样产生自由意志的呢?两岁时,她跑来跑去,指着四周每一样东西。三岁时她总是缠着妈妈叽哩呱啦说个不停。四岁时,她突然变得怕黑。所谓的自由究竟在哪里?”
“我也不知道。”
“当她十五岁时,她坐在镜子前面练习化妆。难道这就是她开始为自己做决定并且随心所欲做事的时候吗?”
“我开始明白你的意思了。”
“当然,她是苏菲,但她同时也依据自然法则而活。问题在于她自己并不了解这点,因为她所做的每一件事背后都有很多复杂的理由。”
“好了,你不需要再说了。”
“可是最后你必须回答一个问题。在一个大花园中,有两棵年纪一样大的树。其中一棵长在充满阳光、土壤肥沃、水分充足的地方,另外一棵长在土壤贫瘠的黑暗角落。你想哪一棵树会长得比较大?哪一棵树会结比较多的果子?”
“当然是那棵拥有最佳生长条件的树。”
“史宾诺莎认为,这棵树是自由的,它有充分的自由去发展它先天的能力。但如果它是一棵苹果树,它就不可能有能力长出梨子或李子。同样的道理也适用于我们人类。我们的发展与个人的成长可能会受到政治环境等因素的阻碍,外在的环境可能限制我们,只有在我们能够‘自由’发展本身固有能力时,我们才活得像个自由的人。但无论如何,我们仍然像那个生长在石器时代莱茵河谷的男孩、那只非洲的狮子或花园里那棵苹果树一样受到内在潜能与外在机会的左右。”
“好了。我投降了。”
“史宾诺莎强调世间只有一种存在是完全自主,且可以充分自由行动的,那就是上帝(或自然)。唯有上帝或自然可以表现这种自由、‘非偶然’的过程。人可以争取自由,以便去除外在的束缚,但他永远不可能获得‘自由意志’。我们不能控制发生在我们体内的每一件事,这是扩延属性的一个模态。我们也不能‘选择’自己的思想。因此,人并没有自由的灵魂,他的灵魂或多或少都被囚禁在一个类似机器的身体内。”
“这个理论实在很难了解。”
“史宾诺莎指出,使我们无法获得真正的幸福与和谐的是我们内心的各种冲动。例如我们的野心和欲望。但如果我们体认到每一件事的发生都有其必然性,我们就可以凭直觉理解整个大自然。
我们会很清楚地领悟到每一件事都有关联,每一件事情都是一体的。最后的目标是以一种全然接纳的观点来理解世间的事物。只有这样,我们才能获得真正的幸福与满足。这是史宾诺莎所说的subspecieaeternitatis。”
“什么意思?”
“从永恒的观点来看每一件事情。我们一开始不就是讲这个吗?”
“到这里我们也该结束了。我得走了。”
艾伯特站起身来,从书架上拿了一个大水果盘,放在茶几上。
“你走前不吃点水果吗?”
苏菲拿了一根香蕉,艾伯特则拿了一个绿苹果。
她把香蕉的顶端弄破,开始剥皮。
“这里写了几个字。”她突然说。
“哪里?”
“这里——香蕉皮里面。好像是用毛笔写的。”
苏菲倾过身子,把香蕉拿给艾伯特看。他把字念出来:
“席德,我又来了。孩子,我是无所不在的。生日快乐!”
“真滑稽。”苏菲说。
“他愈来愈会变把戏了。”
“可是这是不可能的呀……是不是?黎巴嫩也种香蕉吗?”
艾伯特摇摇头。
“这种香蕉我才不要吃呢!”
“那就别吃吧。要是谁把送给女儿的生日贺词写在一根没有剥的香蕉里面,那他一定神经不太正常,可是一定也很聪明。”
“可不是嘛!”
“那我们可不可以从此认定席德有一个很聪明的父亲?换句话说,他并不笨。”
“我不是早就告诉过你了吗?上次我来这里时,让你一直叫我席德的人很可能就是他。也许他就是那个透过我们的嘴巴说话的人。”
“任何一种情况都有可能,但我们也应该怀疑每一件事情。”
“我只知道,我们的生命可能只是一场梦。”
“我们还是不要太早下结论。也许有一个比较简单的解释。”
“不管怎样,我得赶快回家了。妈妈正在等我呢尸艾伯特送她到门口。她离去时,他说:
“亲爱的席德,我们会再见面。”
然后门就关了。
5
 楼主| 发表于 2019-1-27 11:44:14 | 只看该作者
LOCKE

as hare and empty as a blackboard before the teacher arrives

Sophie arrived home at eight-thirty. That was one and a half hours after the agreement--which was not really an agreement. She had simply skipped dinner and left a message for her mother that she would be back not later than seven.

"This has got to stop, Sophie. I had to call information and ask if they had any record of anyone named Alberto in the Old Town. They laughed at me."

"I couldn't get away. I think we're just about to make a breakthrough in a huge mystery."

"Nonsense!"

"It's true!"

"Did you invite him to your party?"

"Oh no, I forgot."

"Well, now I insist on meeting him. Tomorrow at the latest. It's not natural for a young girl to be meeting an older man like this."

"You've got no reason to be scared of Alberto. It may be worse with Hilde's father."

"Who's Hilde?"

"The daughter of the man in Lebanon. He's really bad. He may be controlling the whole world."

"If you don't immediately introduce me to your Alberto, I won't allow you to see him again. I won't feel easy about him until I at least know what he looks like."

Sophie had a brilliant idea and dashed up to her room.

"What's the matter with you now?" her mother called after her.

In a flash Sophie was back again.

"In a minute you'll see what he looks like. And then I hope you'll let me be."

She waved the video cassette and went over to the VCR.

"Did he give you a video?"

"From Athens..."

Pictures of the Acropolis soon appeared on the screen. Her mother sat dumbfounded as Alberto came forward and began to speak directly to Sophie.

Sophie now noticed something she had forgotten about. The Acropolis was crowded with tourists milling about in their respective groups. A small placard was being held up from the middle of one group. On it was written HILDE ... Alberto continued his wandering on the Acropolis. After a while he went down through the entrance and climbed to the Areopagos hill where Paul had addressed the Athenians. Then he went on to talk to Sophie from the square.

Her mother sat commenting on the video in short utterances:

"Incredible... is that Alberto? He mentioned the rabbit again... But, yes, he's really talking to you, Sophie. I didn't know Paul went to Athens ..."

The video was coming to the part where ancient Athens suddenly rises from the ruins. At the last minute Sophie managed to stop the tape. Now that she had shown her mother Alberto, there was no need to introduce her to Plato as well.

There was silence in the room.

"What do you think of him? He's quite good-looking, isn't he?" teased Sophie.

"What a strange man he must be, having himself filmed in Athens just so he could send it to a girl he hardly knows. When was he in Athens?"

"I haven't a clue."

"But there's something else ..."

"What?"

"He looks very much like the major who lived in that little hut in the woods."

"Well maybe it is him, Mom."

"But nobody has seen him for over fifteen years."

"He probably moved around a lot... to Athens, maybe."

Her mother shook her head. "When I saw him sometime in the seventies, he wasn't a day younger than this Alberto I just saw. He had a foreign-sounding name..."

"Knox?"

"Could be, Sophie. Could be his name was Knox."

"Or was it Knag?"

"I can't for the life of me remember ... Which Knox or Knag are you talking about?"

"One is Alberto, the other is Hilde's father."

"It's all making me dizzy."

"Is there any food in the house?"

"You can warm up the meatballs."

Exactly two weeks went by without Sophie hearing a word from Alberto. She got another birthday card for Hilde, but although the actual day was approaching, she did not receive a single birthday card herself.

One afternoon she went to the Old Town and knocked on Alberto's door. He was out, but there was a short note attached to his door. It said:

Happy birthday, Hilde! Now the great turning point is at hand. The moment of truth, little one. Every time I think about it, I can't stop laughing. It has naturally something to do with Berkeley, so hold on to your hat.

Sophie tore the note off the door and stuffed it into Alberto's mailbox as she went out.

Damn! Surely he'd not gone back to Athens? How could he leave her with so many questions unanswered?

When she got home from school on June 14, Hermes was romping about in the garden. Sophie ran toward him and he came prancing happily toward her. She put her arms around him as if he were the one who could solve all the riddles.

Again she left a note for her mother, but this time she put Alberto's address on it.

As they made their way across town Sophie thought about tomorrow. Not about her own birthday so much-- that was not going to be celebrated until Midsummer Eve anyway. But tomorrow was Hilde's birthday too. Sophie was convinced something quite extraordinary would happen. At least there would be an end to all those birthday cards from Lebanon.

When they had crossed Main Square and were making for the Old Town, they passed by a park with a playground. Hermes stopped by a bench as if he wanted Sophie to sit down.

She did, and while she patted the dog's head she looked into his eyes. Suddenly the dog started to shudder violently. He's going to bark now, thought Sophie.

Then his jaws began to vibrate, but Hermes neither growled nor barked. He opened his mouth and said:

"Happy birthday, Hilde!"

Sophie was speechless. Did the dog just talk to her? Impossible, she must have imagined it because she was thinking of Hilde. But deep down she was nevertheless convinced that Hermes had spoken, and in a deep resonant bass voice.

The next second everything was as before. Hermes gave a couple of demonstrative barks--as if to cover up the fact that he had just spoken with a human voice-- and trotted on ahead toward Alberto's place. As they were going inside Sophie looked up at the sky. It had been fine weather all day but now heavy clouds were beginning to gather in the distance.

Alberto opened the door and Sophie said at once:

"No civilities, please. You are a great idiot, and you know it."

"What's the matter now?"

"The major taught Hermes to talk!"

"Ah, so it has come to that."

"Yes, imagine!"

"And what did he say?"

"I'll give you three guesses."

"I imagine he said something along the lines of Happy Birthday!"

"Bingo."

Alberto let Sophie in. He was dressed in yet another costume. It wasn't all that different from last time, but today there were hardly any braidings, bows, or lace.

"But that's not all," Sophie said.

"What do you mean?"

"Didn't you find the note in the mailbox?"

"Oh, that. I threw it away at once."

"I don't care if he laughs every time he thinks of Berkeley. But what is so funny about that particular philosopher?"

"We'll have to wait and see."

"But today is the day you're going to talk about him, isn't it?"

"Yes, today is the day."

Alberto made himself comfortable on the sofa. Then he said:

"Last time we sat here I told you about Descartes and Spinoza. We agreed that they had one important thing in common, namely, that they were both rationalists."

"And a rationalist is someone who believes strongly in the importance of reason."

"That's right, a rationalist believes in reason as the primary source of knowledge, and he may also believe that man has certain innate ideas that exist in the mind prior to all experience. And the clearer such ideas may be, the more certain it is that they correspond to reality. You recall how Descartes had a clear and distinct idea of a 'perfect entity,' on the basis of which he concluded that God exists."

"I am not especially forgetful."

"Rationalist thinking of this kind was typical for philosophy of the seventeenth century. It was also firmly rooted in the Middle Ages, and we remember it from Plato and Socrates too. But in the eighteenth century it was the object of an ever increasing in-depth criticism. A number of philosophers held that we have absolutely nothing in the mind that we have not experienced through the senses. A view such as this is called empiricism."

"And you are going to talk about them today, these empiricists?"

"I'm going to attempt to, yes. The most important empiricists--or philosophers of experience--were Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, and all three were British. The leading rationalists in the seventeenth century were Descartes, who was French; Spinoza, who was Dutch; and Leibniz, who was German. So we usually make a distinction between British empiricism and Continental rationalism."

"What a lot of difficult words! Could you repeat the meaning of empiricism?"

"An empiricist will derive all knowledge of the world from what the senses tell us. The classic formulation of an empirical approach came from Aristotle. He said: 'There is nothing in the mind except what was first in the senses.' This view implied a pointed criticism of Plato, who had held that man brought with him a set of innate 'ideas' from the world of ideas. Locke repeats Aristotle's words, and when Locke uses them, they are aimed at Descartes."

"There is nothing in the mind... except what was first in the senses?"

"We have no innate ideas or conceptions about the world we are brought into before we have seen it. If we do have a conception or an idea that cannot be related to experienced facts, then it will be a false conception. When we, for instance, use words like 'God,"eternity,' or 'substance,' reason is being misused, because nobody has experienced God, eternity, or what philosophers have called substance. So therefore many learned dissertations could be written which in actual fact contain no really new conceptions. An ingeniously contrived philosophical system such as this may seem impressive, but it is pure fantasy. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers had inherited a number of such learned dissertations. Now they had to be examined under a microscope. They had to be purified of all hollow notions. We might compare it with panning for gold. Most of what you fish up is sand and clay, but in between you see the glint of a particle of gold."

"And that particle of gold is real experience?"

"Or at least thoughts that can be related to experience. It became a matter of great importance to the British empiricists to scrutinize all human conceptions to see whether there was any basis for them in actual experience. But let us take one philosopher at a time."

"Okay, shoot!"

"The first was the Englishman John Locke, who lived from 1632 to 1704. His main work was the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, published in 1690. In it he tried to clarify two questions. First, where we get our ideas from, and secondly, whether we can rely on what our senses tell us."

"That was some project!"

"We'll take these questions one at a time. Locke's claim is that all our thoughts and ideas issue from that which we have taken in through the senses. Before we perceive anything, the mind is a 'tabula rasa'--or an empty slate."

"You can skip the Latin."

"Before we sense anything, then, the mind is as bare and empty as a blackboard before the teacher arrives in the classroom. Locke also compared the mind to an unfurnished room. But then we begin to sense things. We see the world around us, we smell, taste, feel, and hear. And nobody does this more intensely than infants. In this way what Locke called simple ideas of sense arise. But the mind does not just passively receive information from outside it. Some activity happens in the mind as well. The single sense ideas are worked on by thinking, reasoning, believing, and doubting, thus giving rise to what he calls reflection. So he distinguished between 'sensation' and 'reflection.' The mind is not merely a passive receiver. It classifies and processes all sensations as they come streaming in. And this is just where one must be on guard."

"On guard?"

"Locke emphasized that the only things we can perceive are simple sensations. When I eat an apple, for example, I do not sense the whole apple in one single sensation. In actual fact I receive a whole series of simple sensations--such as that something is green, smells fresh, and tastes juicy and sharp. Only after I have eaten an apple many times do I think: Now I am eating an 'apple.' As Locke would say, we have formed a complex idea of an 'apple.' When we were infants, tasting an apple for the first time, we had no such complex idea. But we saw something green, we tasted something fresh and juicy, yummy ... It was a bit sour too. Little by little we bundle many similar sensations together and form concepts like 'apple,"pear,"orange.' But in the final analysis, all the material for our knowledge of the world comes to us through sensations. Knowledge that cannot be traced back to a simple sensation is therefore false knowledge and must consequently be rejected."

"At any rate we can be sure that what we see, hear, smell, and taste are the way we sense it."

"Both yes and no. And that brings us to the second question Locke tried to answer. He had first answered the question of where we get our ideas from. Now he asked whether the world really is the way we perceive it. This is not so obvious, you see, Sophie. We mustn't jump to conclusions. That is the only thing a real philosopher must never do."

"I didn't say a word."

"Locke distinguished between what he called 'primary' and 'secondary' qualities. And in this he acknowledged his debt to the great philosophers before him-- including Descartes.

"By primary qualities he meant extension, weight, motion and number, and so on. When it is a question of qualities such as these, we can be certain that the senses reproduce them objectively. But we also sense other qualities in things. We say that something is sweet or sour, green or red, hot or cold. Locke calls these secondary qualities. Sensations like these--color, smell, taste, sound--do not reproduce the real qualities that are inherent in the things themselves. They reproduce only the effect of the outer reality on our senses."

"Everyone to his own taste, in other words."

"Exactly. Everyone can agree on the primary qualities like size and weight because they lie within the objects themselves. But the secondary qualities like color and taste can vary from person to person and from animal to animal, depending on the nature of the individual's sensations."

"When Joanna eats an orange, she gets a look on her face like when other people eat a lemon. She can't take more than one segment at a time. She says it tastes sour. I usually think the same orange is nice and sweet."

"And neither one of you is right or wrong. You are just describing how the orange affects your senses. It's the same with the sense of color. Maybe you don't like a certain shade of red. But if Joanna buys a dress in that color it might be wise to keep your opinion to yourself. You experience the color differently, but it is neither pretty nor ugly."

"But everyone can agree that an orange is round."

"Yes, if you have a round orange, you can't 'think' it is square. You can 'think' it is sweet or sour, but you can't 'think' it weighs eight kilos if it only weighs two hundred grams. You can certainly 'believe' it weighs several kilos, but then you'd be way off the mark. If several people have to guess how much something weighs, there will always be one of them who is more right than the others. The same applies to number. Either there are 986 peas in the can or there are not. The same with motion. Either the car is moving or it's stationary."

"I get it."

"So when it was a question of 'extended' reality, Locke agreed with Descartes that it does have certain qualities that man is able to understand with his reason."

"It shouldn't be so difficult to agree on that."

"Locke admitted what he called intuitive, or 'demonstrative,' knowledge in other areas too. For instance, he held that certain ethical principles applied to everyone. In other words, he believed in the idea of a natural right, and that was a rationalistic feature of his thought. An equally rationalistic feature was that Locke believed that it was inherent in human reason to be able to know that God exists."

"Maybe he was right."

"About what?"

"That God exists."

"It is possible, of course. But he did not let it rest on faith. He believed that the idea of God was born of human reason. That was a rationalistic feature. I should add that he spoke out for intellectual liberty and tolerance. He was also preoccupied with equality of the sexes, maintaining that the subjugation of women to men was 'man-made.' Therefore it could be altered."

"I can't disagree there."

"Locke was one of the first philosophers in more recent times to be interested in sexual roles. He had a great influence on John Stuart Mill, who in turn had a key role in the struggle for equality of the sexes. All in all, Locke was a forerunner of many liberal ideas which later, during the period of the French Enlightenment in the eighteenth century, came into full flower. It was he who first advocated the principle of division of powers..."

"Isn't that when the power of the state is divided between different institutions?"

"Do you remember which institutions?"

"There's the legislative power, or elected representatives. There's the judicial power, or law courts, and then there's the executive power, that's the government."

"This division of power originated from the French Enlightenment philosopher Montesquieu. Locke had first and foremost emphasized that the legislative and the executive power must be separated if tyranny was to be avoided. He lived at the time of Louis XIV, who had assembled all power in his own hands. 'I am the State,' he said. We say he was an 'absolute' ruler. Nowadays we would call Louis XIV's rule lawless and arbitrary. Locke's view was that to ensure a legal State, the people's representatives must make the laws and the king or the government must apply them."
6
 楼主| 发表于 2019-1-27 11:44:47 | 只看该作者
洛克

  ……赤裸、空虚一如教师来到教室前的黑板……
苏菲回到家时已经八点半了,比她和妈妈说好的时间迟了一个半小时。其实她也没和妈妈说好,她只是在吃晚饭前离家,留了一张纸条给妈妈说她会七点前回来。
“苏菲,你不能再这样了。我刚才急得打查号台,问他们有没有登记住在旧市区的艾伯特这个人,结果还被人家笑。”
“我走不开呀!我想我们正要开始解开这个大谜团。”
“胡说八道!”
“是真的。”
“你请他参加你的生日宴会了吗?”
“糟糕,我忘了!”
“那么,我现在一定要见见他。最迟在明天。一个年轻女孩像这样和一个年纪比她大的男人见面是不正常的。”
“你没有理由担心艾伯特。席德的爸爸可能更糟糕。”
“席德是谁?”
“那个在黎巴嫩的男人的女儿。他真的很坏,他可能控制了全世界。”
“如果你不立刻介绍你的艾伯特给我认识,我就不准你再跟他见面。至少我要知道他长得什么样子,否则我不会放心。”
苏菲想到了一个很好的主意。于是她马上冲到房间去。
“你现在又是怎么回事?”妈妈在她背后叫她。
一转眼的工夫,苏菲就回来了。
“你马上就可以看到他的长相,然后我希望你就不要管这件事了。”
她挥一挥手中的录影带,然后走到录影机旁。
“他给你一卷录影带?”
“从雅典……”
不久,雅典的高城就出现在荧屏上。当艾伯特出现,并开始向苏菲说话时,妈妈看得目瞪口呆。
这次苏菲注意到一件她已经忘记的事。高城里到处都是游客,三五成群的往来穿梭。其中有一群人当中举起了一块小牌子,上面写着“席德”
……
艾伯特继续在高城漫步。一会儿之后,他往下面走,穿过人口,并爬上当年保罗对雅典人演讲的小山丘。然后他继续从那里的广场上向苏菲说话。
妈妈坐在那儿,不时发表着评论:“真不可思议……那就是艾伯特吗?他又开始讲关于兔子的事了……可是……没错哎,苏菲,他真的是在对你讲话。我不知道保罗还到过雅典……”
录影带正要放到古城雅典突然从废墟中兴起的部分,苏菲连忙把带子停掉。现在她已经让妈妈看到艾伯特了,没有必要再把柏拉图介绍给她。
客厅里一片静寂。
“你认为他这个人怎么样?长得很好看对不对?”苏菲开玩笑地说。
“他一定是个怪人,才会在雅典拍摄自己的录影带,送给一个他几乎不认识的女孩子。他是什么时候跑到雅典去的?”
“我不知道。”
“还有……”
“还有什么?”
“他很像是住在林间小木屋的那个少校。”
“也许就是他呢!”
“可是已经有十五年都没有人看过他了。”
“他也许到处游历……也许到雅典去了。”
妈妈摇摇头。
“我在七十年代看到他时,他一点都不比我刚才看到的这个艾伯特年轻。他有一个听起来像是外国人的名字……”
“是艾伯特吗?”
“大概吧。”
“还是艾勃特?”
“我一点都不记得了……你说的这两个人是谁?”
“一个是艾伯特,一个是席德的爸爸。”
“你把我弄得头都昏了。”
“家里有东西吃吗?”
“你把肉丸子热一热吧。”
失踪整整两个礼拜过去了,艾伯特消息全无。这期间苏菲又接到了一张寄给席德的生日卡,不过虽然她自己的生日也快到了,她却连一张卡片也没接到。
一天下午,她到旧市区去敲艾伯特的门。他不在家,只见门上贴着一张短短的字条,上面写着:席德,生日快乐!现在那个大转捩点就要到了。孩子,这是关键性的一刻。我每次想到这里,就忍不住笑得差点尿裤子。当然这和柏克莱有点关系,所以把你的帽子抓紧吧!苏菲临走时,把门上的字条撕了下来,塞进艾伯特的信箱。
该死!他不会跑回雅典去吧?还有这么多问题等待解答,他怎么可以离她而去呢?经验主义六月十四日,她放学回家时,汉密士已经在花园里跑来跑去了。苏菲向它飞奔过去,它也快活地迎向她。她用双手抱着它,仿佛它可以解开她所有的谜题。
这天,苏菲又留了一张纸条给妈妈,但这一次她同时写下了艾伯特的地址。
他们经过镇上时,苏菲心里想着明天的事。她想的主要并不是她自己的生日。何况她的生日要等到仲夏节那一天才过。不过,明天也是席德的生日。苏菲相信明天一定会有很不寻常的事发生。至少从明天起不会有人从黎巴嫩寄生日卡来了。
当他们经过大广场,走向旧市区时,经过了一个有游乐场的公园。汉密士在一张椅旁停了下来,仿佛希望苏菲坐下来似的。
于是苏菲便坐了下来。她拍拍汉密士的头,并注视它的眼睛。
突然间汉密士开始猛烈地颤抖。苏菲心想,它要开始吠了。
然后汉密士的下颚开始振动,但它既没有吠,也没有汪汪叫。
它开口说话了:“生日快乐,席德!”
苏菲惊讶得目瞪口呆。汉密士刚才真的跟她讲话了吗?不可能的。那一定是她的幻觉,因为她刚才正想着席德的事。
不过内心深处她仍相信汉密士刚才确实曾开口说话…..•而且声音低沉而厚实。
一秒钟后,一切又恢复正常。汉密士吠了两三声,仿佛是要遮掩刚才开口说人话的事实。然后继续往艾伯特的住所走去。当他们正要进屋时,苏菲抬头看了一下天色。今天整天都是晴朗的天气,但现在远方已经开始聚集了厚重的云层。
艾伯特一打开门,苏菲便说:“别多礼了,拜托。你是个大白痴,你自己知道。”
“怎么啦?”
“少校让汉密士讲话了!”
“哦,已经到了这个地步?”
“是呀!你能想象吗?”
“那他说些什么呢?”
“我让你猜三次。”
“我猜他大概是说些类似生日快乐的话。”
“答对了!”
艾伯特让苏菲进门。这次他又穿了不同的衣裳,与上次的差别不是很大,但今天他身上几乎没有任何穗带、蝴蝶结或花边。
“可是还有一件事。”苏菲说。
“什么意思?”
“你没有看到信箱里的纸条吗?”
“喔,你是说那个。我马上把它扔掉。”
;“我才不在乎他每次想到柏克莱时是否真的尿湿了裤子,可是那个哲学家到底是怎么回事,才会使他那个样子?”
“这个我们再看看吧。”
“你今天不就是要讲他吗?”
“是,啊,没错,就是今天。”
艾伯特舒适地坐在沙发上,然后说道:“上次我们坐在这儿时,我向你说明笛卡尔和史宾诺莎的哲学。我们一致同意他们两人有一点很相像,那就是:他们显然都是理性主义者。”
“而理性主义者就是坚信理性很重要的人。”
“没错,理性主义者相信理性是知识的泉源。不过他可能也同意人在还没有任何经验之前,心中已经先有了一些与生俱来的概念。这些概念愈清晰,必然就愈与实体一致。你应该还记得笛卡尔对于‘完美实体’有清晰的概念,并且以此断言上帝确实存在。”
“我的记性还不算差。”
“类似这样的理性主义思想是十七世纪哲学的特征,这种思想早在中世纪时就打下了深厚的基础。柏拉图与苏格拉底也有这种倾向。但在十八世纪时,理性主义思想受到的批判日益严格。当时有些哲学家认为,如果不是透过感官的体验,我们的心中将一无所有,这种观点被称为‘经验主义’。”
“你今天就是要谈那些主张经验主义的哲学家吗?”
“是的。最重要的经验主义哲学家是洛克、柏克莱与休姆,都是英国人。十七世纪主要的理性主义哲学当中,笛卡尔是法国人,史宾诺莎是荷兰人,莱布尼兹则是德国人。所以我们通常区分为‘英国的经验主义’与‘欧陆的理性主义’。”
“这些字眼都好难呀!你可以把经验主义的意思再说一次吗?”
“经验主义者就是那些从感官的经验获取一切关于世界的知识的人。亚理斯多德曾经说过;‘我们的心灵中所有的事物都是先透过感官而来的。’这是对经验主义的最佳说明。这种观点颇有批评柏拉图的意味。因为柏拉图认为人生下来就从观念世界带来了一整套的‘观念’。洛克则重复亚理斯多德说的话,但他针对的对象是笛卡尔。”
“我们心灵中所有的事物都是先透过感官而来的?”
“这句话的意思是:我们在看到这个世界之前对它并没有任何固有的概念或观念。如果我们有一个观念或概念是和我们所经验的事实完全不相关的,则它将是一个虚假的观念。举例来说,当我们说出‘上帝’、‘永恒’或‘实体’这些字眼时,我们并没有运用我们的理智,因为没有人曾经体验过上帝、永恒或哲学家所谓的‘实体’这些东西。因此,虽然有许多博学之士著书立说,探讨这些事物,但事实上他们并没有提出什么新见解。这类精心构筑的哲学体系可能令人印象深刻,但却是百分之百的虚幻。十七、十八世纪的哲学家虽然继承了若干这类理论,但他们现在要把这些理论拿到显微镜下检视,以便把所有空洞不实的观念淘汰掉。我们可以将这个过程比喻为淘金。你所淘取的东西大多是沙子和泥土,但偶尔你会发现一小片闪闪发亮的金屑。”
“那片金屑就是真正的经验吗?”
“至少是一些与经验有关的思想。那些英国的经验主义哲学家认为,仔细检视人类所有的观念,以确定它们是否根据实际的经验而来,乃是一件很重要的事。不过,我们还是一次谈一位哲学家好了。”
“好,那就开始吧。”
“第一位是英国哲学家洛克(JohnLocke)。他生于一六三二到一七O四年间,主要的作品是《论人之理解力》(EssayConcerningHumanUnderstanding),出版于一六九O年。他在书中试图澄清两个问题:第一,我们的概念从何而来?第二,我们是否可以信赖感官的经验?”
“有意思。”
“我们一次谈一个问题好了。洛克宣称,我们所有的思想和观念都反映我们曾看过、听过的事物。在我们看过、听过任何事物之前,我们的心灵就像一块Tabularasa,意思是‘空白的板子’。”
“请你不要再讲拉丁文了。”
“洛克认为,在我们的感官察知任何事物前,我们的心灵就像老师还没有进教室之前的黑板一样空白。他也将此时我们的心灵;比做一间没有家具的房间。可是后来我们开始经验一些事物,我们看到周遭的世界,我们闻到、尝到、摸到、听到各种东西。其中又以婴儿最为敏锐。这是洛克所谓的‘单一感官概念’。然而,我们的心灵除了被动地接收外界的印象之外,同时也积极地进行某种活动,它以思考、推理、相信、怀疑等方式来处理它所得到的各种单一感官概念,因此产生了洛克所谓的‘思维’(reflection)。所以说,他认为感觉(sensation)与思维是不同的,我们的心灵并不只是一具被动的接收器,它也会将所有不断传进来的感觉加以分类、处理。而这些是我们需要当心的地方。”
“当心?”
“洛克强调,我们唯一能感知的事物是那些‘单一感觉’。例如,当我吃一个苹果时,我并不能一次感知整个苹果的模样与滋味。事实上,我所接到的是一连串的单一感觉,诸如它是绿色的、闻起来很新鲜、尝起来脆又多汁等。一直要等到我吃了许多口之后,我才能说:我正在吃‘苹果’。洛克的意思是,我们自己形成了一个有关‘苹果’的‘复合概念’。当我们还是婴儿,初次尝到苹果时,我们并没有这种复合概念。我们只是看到一个绿色的东西,尝起来新鲜多汁,好吃……还有点酸。我们就这样一点一滴地将许多类似的感觉放在一起,形成‘苹果’、‘梨子’或‘橘子’这些概念。但根本上,使我们得以认识这个世界的所有材料都来自感官。那些无法回溯到一种单一感觉的知识便是虚假的知识,我们不应该接受。”
“无论如何,我可以确定这些事物便是像我们所看到、听到、闻到和尝到的一般。”
“可以说是,也可以说不是。谈到这点,我们就要讨论洛克尝试解答的第二个问题。刚才他已经回答了‘我们的概念从哪里来?’这个问题。现在他的问题是:‘这世界是否真的就像我们所感知的那样?’答案并不很明显。因此,苏菲,我们不能太早下定论。一个真正的哲学家绝不会遽下定论。”
“我一句话也没有说呀!”
“洛克将感官的性质分为‘主要’与‘次要’两种。在这方面他承认受到笛卡尔等大哲学家的影响。所谓的‘主要性质’指的是扩延世界的特质,如重量、运动和数量等等。我们谈的是这类特质时,我们可以确定我们的感官已经将它们加以客观地再现。但事物还有其他特质,如酸或甜、绿或红、热或冷等。洛克称它们为‘次要性质,。类似颜色、气息、味道、声音等感觉并不能真正反映事物本身的固有性质,而只是反映外在实体在我们的感官上所产生的作用。”
“换句话说,就是人各有所好。”
“一点都没有错。在尺寸、重量等性质上,每个人都会有一致的看法,因为这些性质就存在于事物本身之内。但类似颜色、味道等次要性质就可能因人而异,因动物而异,要看每个人感觉的本质而定。”
“乔安吃柳丁时,脸上的表情跟别人在吃柠檬时一样。她一次最多只能吃一片,她说柳丁很酸。可是同样的一个柳丁,我吃起来却往往觉得很甜、很好吃。”
“你们两个人没有谁对,也没有谁错。你只是描述柳丁对你的感官所产生的作用而已。我们对颜色的感觉也是一样。你也许不喜欢某种色调的红,但如果乔安买了一件那种颜色的衣服,你最好还是不要加以批评。你对颜色的体验与别人不同,但颜色的本身并没有美丑可言。”
“可是每一个人都会说柳丁是圆的。”
“是的,如果你面前的柳丁是圆的,你就不会‘以为’它是方的。
称会‘以为’它是甜的或酸的,但如果它的重量只有两百克,你不会‘以为’它有八公斤重。你当然可以‘相信’它重达几公斤,但如果这样的话,你一定是个不折不扣的呆子。如果你同时要几个人来猜某东西的重量,那么一定会有一个人的答案比较接近。同样的道理也适用于数目。罐子里豌豆的数量要不就是九八六个,要不就不是,动作方面也是一样。一辆汽车要不就是正在移动,要不就是在静止的状态。”
“我懂了。”
“所以当牵涉到‘扩延’的实体时,洛克同意笛卡尔的说法,认为确实有些性质是人可用理智来了解的。”
“在这方面取得共识应该不会太难才对。”
“洛克也承认笛卡尔所谓‘直觉的’或‘明示的’(demonstrative)知识在其他方面也存在。例如,他认为每个人都有相同的一些道德原则。换句话说,他相信世间有所谓‘自然权利’(naturalright)存在。这正是理性主义者的特征。洛克与理性主义者相像的另外一点是:他相信人类凭理性就自然而然可以知道上帝的存在。”
“他说的也许没错。”
“你是指哪一方面?”
“上帝确实存在这件事。”
“这当然是有可能的。不过他并不以为这只是一种信仰,他相信关于上帝的概念是原本就存在于人的理性之内的。这也是理性主义者的特色。还有,他也公开提倡知识自由与宽容的精神,并很关心两性平等的问题。他宣称,女人服从男人的现象是受到男人操纵的结果,因此是可以加以改变的。”
“这点我不能不同意。”
“洛克是近代哲学家中最先关心性别角色的人之一。他对于另外一个英国哲学家弥尔(JohnStuartMill)有很大的影响。而后者又在两性平等运动中扮演了举足轻重的角色。总而言之,洛克倡导了许多开明的观念,而这些观念后来在十八世纪的法国启蒙运动中终于开花结果。他也是首先倡导‘政权分立’原则的人。”
“他的意思是不是说国家的政权必须由不同的机构共同持有……?”
“你还记得是哪些机构吗?”
“人民所选出的代表握有立法权,法院握有司法权,政府握有行政权。”
“政权分立的观念最初是由法国启蒙运动时期的哲学家孟德斯鸠(Montesquieu)提出。但洛克最早强调立法权与行政权必须分立,以防止专制政治。他生在路易十四统治的年代。路易十四一人独揽所有政权,并说:‘朕即国家。’因此我们说他是很‘专制’的君主。这种政治我们称之为‘无政府状态’。洛克的观点是:为了确保国家的法治,必须由人民的代表制定法律,而由国王或政府执行法律。”
7
 楼主| 发表于 2019-1-29 11:18:34 | 只看该作者
Hume

commit it then to the flames

Alberto sat staring down at the table. He finally turned and looked out of the window.

"It's clouding over," said Sophie.

"Yes, it's muggy."

"Are you going to talk about Berkeley now?"

"He was the next of the three British empiricists. But as he is in a category of his own in many ways, we will first concentrate on David Hume, who lived from 1711 to 1776. He stands out as the most important of the empiricists. He is also significant as the person who set the great philosopher Immanuel Kant on the road to his philosophy."

"Doesn't it matter to you that I'm more interested in Berkeley's philosophy?"

"That's of no importance. Hume grew up near Edinburgh in Scotland. His family wanted him to take up law but he felt 'an insurmountable resistance to everything but philosophy and learning.' He lived in the Age of Enlightenment at the same time as great French thinkers like Voltaire and Rousseau, and he traveled widely in Europe before returning to settle down in Edinburgh toward the end of his life. His main work, A Treatise of Human Nature, was published when Hume was twenty-eight years old, but he claimed that he got the idea for the book when he was only fifteen."

"I see I don't have any time to waste."

"You have already begun."

"But if I were going to formulate my own philosophy, it would be quite different from anything I've heard up to now."

"Is there anything in particular that's missing?"

"Well, to start with, all the philosophers you have talked about are men. And men seem to live in a world of their own. I am more interested in the real world, where there are flowers and animals and children that are born and grow up. Your philosophers are always talking about 'man' and 'humans,' and now here's another treatise on 'human nature.' It's as if this 'human' is a middle-aged man. I mean, life begins with pregnancy and birth, and I've heard nothing about diapers or crying babies so far. And hardly anything about love and friendship."

"You are right, of course. But Hume was a philosopher who thought in a different way. More than any other philosopher, he took the everyday world as his starting point. I even think Hume had a strong feeling for the way children--the new citizens of the world-- experienced life."

"I'd better listen then."

"As an empiricist, Hume took it upon himself to clean up all the woolly concepts and thought constructions that these male philosophers had invented. There were piles of old wreckage, both written and spoken, from the Middle Ages and the rationalist philosophy of the seventeenth century. Hume proposed the return to our spontaneous experience of the world. No philosopher 'will ever be able to take us behind the daily experiences or give us rules of conduct that are different from those we get through reflections on everyday life,' he said."

"Sounds promising so far. Can you give any examples?"

"In the time of Hume there was a widespread belief in angels. That is, human figures with wings. Have you ever seen such a creature, Sophie?"

"No."

"But you have seen a human figure?"

"Dumb question."

"You have also seen wings?"

"Of course, but not on a human figure."

"So, according to Hume, an 'angel' is a complex idea. It consists of two different experiences which are not in fact related, but which nevertheless are associated in man's imagination. In other words, it is a false idea which must be immediately rejected. We must tidy up all our thoughts and ideas, as well as our book collections, in the same way. For as Hume put it: If we take in our hands any volume ... let us ask, 'Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?' No. 'Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?' No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion."

"That was drastic."

"But the world still exists. More fresh and sharply outlined than ever. Hume wanted to know how a child experiences the world. Didn't you say that many of the philosophers you have heard about lived in their own world, and that you were more interested in the real world?"

"Something like that."

"Hume could have said the same thing. But let us follow his train of thought more closely."

"I'm with you."

"Hume begins by establishing that man has two different types of perceptions, namely impressions and ideas. By 'impressions' he means the immediate sensation of external reality. By 'ideas' he means the recollection of such impressions."

"Could you give me an example?"

"If you burn yourself on a hot oven, you get an immediate 'impression.' Afterward you can recollect that you burned yourself. That impression insofar as it is recalled is what Hume calls an 'idea.' The difference is that an impression is stronger and livelier than your reflective memory of that impression. You could say that the sensation is the original and that the idea, or reflection, is only a pale imitation. It is the impression which is the direct cause of the idea stored in the mind."

"I follow you--so far."

"Hume emphasizes further that both an impression and an idea can be either simple or complex. You remember we talked about an apple in connection with Locke. The direct experience of an apple is an example of a complex impression."

"Sorry to interrupt, but is this terribly important?"

"Important? How can you ask? Even though philosophers may have been preoccupied with a number of pseudoproblems, you mustn't give up now over the construction of an argument. Hume would probably agree with Descartes that it is essential to construct a thought process right from the ground."

"Okay, okay."

"Hume's point is that we sometimes form complex ideas for which there is no corresponding object in the physical world. We've already talked about angels. Previously we referred to crocophants. Another example is Pegasus, a winged horse. In all these cases we have to admit that the mind has done a good job of cutting out and pasting together all on its own. Each element was once sensed, and entered the theater of the mind in the form of a real 'impression.' Nothing is ever actually invented by the mind. The mind puts things together and constructs false 'ideas.' "

"Yes, I see. That is important."

"All right, then. Hume wanted to investigate every single idea to see whether it was compounded in a way that does not correspond to reality. He asked: From which impression does this idea originate? First of all he had to find out which 'single ideas' went into the making of a complex idea. This would provide him with a critical method by which to analyze our ideas, and thus enable him to tidy up our thoughts and notions."

"Do you have an example or two?"

"In Hume's day, there were a lot of people who had very clear ideas of 'heaven' or the 'New Jerusalem.' You remember how Descartes indicated that 'clear and distinct' ideas in themselves could be a guarantee that they corresponded to something that really existed?"

"I said I was not especially forgetful."

"We soon realize that our idea of 'heaven' is compounded of a great many elements. Heaven is made up of 'pearly gates,"streets of gold,"angels' by the score and so on and so forth. And still we have not broken everything down into single elements, for pearly gates, streets of gold, and angels are all complex ideas in themselves. Only when we recognize that our idea of heaven consists of single notions such as 'pearl,"gate,"street,"gold,"white-robed figure,' and 'wings' can we ask ourselves if we ever really had any such 'simple impressions.' "

"We did. But we cut out and pasted all these 'simple impressions' into one idea."

"That's just what we did. Because if there is something we humans do when we visualize, it's use scissors and paste. But Hume emphasizes that all the elements we put together in our ideas must at some time have entered the mind in the form of 'simple impressions.' A person who has never seen gold will never be able to visualize streets of gold."

"He was very clever. What about Descartes having a clear and distinct idea of God?"

"Hume had an answer to that too. Let's say we imagine God as an infinitely 'intelligent, wise, and good being.' We have thus a 'complex idea' that consists of something infinitely intelligent, something infinitely wise, and something infinitely good. If we had never known intelligence, wisdom, and goodness, we would never have such an idea of God. Our idea of God might also be that he is a 'severe but just Father'--that is to say, a concept made up of 'severity','justice,' and 'father.' Many critics of religion since Hume have claimed that such ideas of God can be associated with how we experienced our own father when we were little. It was said that the idea of a father led to the idea of a 'heavenly father.' "

"Maybe that's true, but I have never accepted that God had to be a man. Sometimes my mother calls God 'Godiva,' just to even things up."

"Anyway, Hume opposed all thoughts and ideas that could not be traced back to corresponding sense perceptions. He said he wanted to 'dismiss all this meaningless nonsense which long has dominated metaphysical thought and brought it into disrepute.'

"But even in everyday life we use complex ideas without stopping to wonder whether they are valid. For example, take the question of T--or the ego. This was the very basis of Descartes's philosophy. It was the one clear and distinct perception that the whole of his phi-losophy was built on."

"I hope Hume didn't try to deny that I am me. He'd be talking off the top of his head."

"Sophie, if there is one thing I want this course to teach you, it's not to jump to conclusions."

"Sorry. Go on."

"No, why don't you use Hume's method and analyze what you perceive as your 'ego.' "

"First I'd have to figure out whether the ego is a single or a complex idea."

"And what conclusion do you come to?"

"I really have to admit that I feel quite complex. I'm very volatile, for instance. And I have trouble making up my mind about things. And I can both like and dislike the same people."

"In other words, the 'ego concept' is a 'complex idea.' "

"Okay. So now I guess I must figure out if I have had a corresponding 'complex impression' of my own ego. And I guess I have. I always had, actually."

"Does that worry you?"

"I'm very changeable. I'm not the same today as I was when I was four years old. My temperament and how I see myself alter from one minute to the next. I can suddenly feel like I am a 'new person.' "

"So the feeling of having an unalterable ego is a false perception. The perception of the ego is in reality a long chain of simple impressions that you have never experienced simultaneously. It is 'nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed one another with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement,' as Hume expressed it. The mind is 'a kind of theater, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, slide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations.' Hume pointed out that we have no underlying 'personal identity' beneath or behind these perceptions and feelings which come and go. It is just like the images on a movie screen. They change so rapidly we do not register that the film is made up of single pictures. In reality the pictures are not connected. The film is a collection of instants."

"I think I give in."

"Does that mean you give up the idea of having an unalterable ego?"

"I guess it does."

"A moment ago you believed the opposite. I should add that Hume's analysis of the human mind and his rejection of the unalterable ego was put forward almost 2,500 years earlier on the other side of the world."

"Who by?"

"By Buddha. It's almost uncanny how similarly the two formulate their ideas. Buddha saw life as an unbroken succession of mental and physical processes which keep people in a continual state of change. The infant is not the same as the adult; I am not the same today as I was yesterday. There is nothing of which I can say 'this is mine,' said Buddha, and nothing of which I can say 'this is me.' There is thus no T or unalterable ego."

"Yes, that was typically Hume."

"In continuation of the idea of an unalterable ego, many rationalists had taken it for granted that man had an eternal soul."

"Is that a false perception too?"

"According to Hume and Buddha, yes. Do you know what Buddha said to his followers just before he died?"

"No, how could I?"

" 'Decay is inherent in all compound things. Work out your own salvation with diligence.' Hume could have said the same thing. Or Democritus, for that matter. We know at all events that Hume rejected any attempt to prove the immortality of the soul or the existence of God. That does not mean that he ruled out either one, but to prove religious faith by human reason was rationalistic claptrap, he thought. Hume was not a Christian, neither was he a confirmed atheist. He was what we call an agnostic."

"What's that?"

"An agnostic is someone who holds that the existence of God or a god can neither be proved nor disproved. When Hume was dying a friend asked him if he believed in life after death. He is said to have answered:

"It is also possible that a knob of coal placed upon the fire will not burn."

"I see."

"The answer was typical of his unconditional open-mindedness. He only accepted what he had perceived through his senses. He held all other possibilities open. He rejected neither faith in Christianity nor faith in miracles. But both were matters of faith and not of knowledge or reason. You might say that with Hume's philosophy, the final link between faith and knowledge was broken."

"You say he didn't deny that miracles can happen?"

"That didn't mean that he believed in them, more the opposite. He made a point of the fact that people seemed to have a powerful need of what we today would call 'supernatural' happenings. The thing is that all the miracles you hear of have always happened in some far distant place or a long, long time ago. Actually, Hume only rejected miracles because he had never experienced any. But he had not experienced that they couldn't happen either."

"You'll have to explain that."

"According to Hume, a miracle is against the laws of nature. But it is meaningless to allege that we have experienced the laws of nature. We experience that a stone falls to the ground when we let go of it, and if it didn't fall--well, then we experienced that.'1"

"I would say that was a miracle--or something supernatural."

"So you believe there are two natures--a 'natural' and a 'supernatural.' Aren't you on the way back to the rationalistic claptrap?"

"Maybe, but I still think the stone will fall to the ground every time I let go."

"Why?"

"Now you're being horrible."

"I'm not horrible, Sophie. It's never wrong for a philosopher to ask questions. We may be getting to the crux of Hume's philosophy. Tell me how you can be so certain that the stone will always fall to the earth."

"I've seen it happen so many times that I'm absolutely certain."

"Hume would say that you have experienced a stone falling to the ground many times. But you have never experienced that it will always fall. It is usual to say that the stone falls to the ground because of the law of gravitation. But we have never experienced such a law. We have only experienced that things fall."

"Isn't that the same thing?"

"Not completely. You say you believe the stone will fall to the ground because you have seen it happen so many times. That's exactly Hume's point. You are so used to the one thing following the other that you expect the same to happen every time you let go of a stone. This is the way the concept of what we like to call 'the unbreakable laws of nature' arises."

"Did he really mean it was possible that a stone would not fall?"

"He was probably just as convinced as you that it would fall every time he tried it. But he pointed out that he had not experienced why it happens."

"Now we're far away from babies and flowers again!"

"No, on the contrary. You are welcome to take children as Hume's verification. Who do you think would be more surprised if the stone floated above the ground for an hour or two--you or a one-year-old child?"

"I guess I would."

"Why?"

"Because I would know better than the child how unnatural it was."

"And why wouldn't the child think it was unnatural?"

"Because it hasn't yet learned how nature behaves."

"Or perhaps because nature hasn't yet become a habit?"

"I see where you're coming from. Hume wanted people to sharpen their awareness."

"So now do the following exercise: let's say you and a small child go to a magic show, where things are made to float in the air. Which of you would have the most fun?"

"I probably would."

"And why would that be?"

"Because I would know how impossible it all is."

"So... for the child it's no fun to see the laws of nature being defied before it has learned what they are."

"I guess that's right."

"And we are still at the crux of Hume's philosophy of experience. He would have added that the child has not yet become a slave of the expectations of habit; he is thus the more open-minded of you two. I wonder if the child is not also the greater philosopher? He comes utterly without preconceived opinions. And that, my dear Sophie, is the philosopher's most distinguishing virtue. The child perceives the world as it is, without putting more into things than he experiences."

"Every time I feel prejudice I get a bad feeling."

"When Hume discusses the force of habit, he concentrates on 'the law of causation.' This law establishes that everything that happens must have a cause. Hume used two billiard balls for his example. If you roll a black billiard ball against a white one that is at rest, what will the white one do?"

"If the black ball hits the white one, the white one will start to move."

"I see, and why will it do that?"

"Because it was hit by the black one."

"So we usually say that the impact of the black ball is the cause of the white ball's starting to move. But remember now, we can only talk of what we have actually experienced."

"I have actually experienced it lots of times. Joanna has a pool table in her basement."

"Hume would say the only thing you have experienced is that the white ball begins to roll across the table. You have not experienced the actual cause of it beginning to roll. You have experienced that one event comes after the other, but you have not experienced that the other event happens because o/the first one."

"Isn't that splitting hairs?"

"No, it's very central. Hume emphasized that the expectation of one thing following another does not lie in the things themselves, but in our mind. And expectation, as we have seen, is associated with habit. Going back to the child again, it would not have stared in amazement if when one billiard ball struck the other, both had remained perfectly motionless. When we speak of the 'laws of nature' or of 'cause and effect,' we are actually speaking of what we expect, rather than what is 'reasonable.' The laws of nature are neither reasonable nor unreasonable, they simply are. The expectation that the white billiard ball will move when it is struck by the black billiard ball is therefore not innate. We are not born with a set of expectations as to what the world is like or how things in the world behave. The world is like it is, and it's something we get to know."

"I'm beginning to feel as if we're getting off the track again."

"Not if our expectations cause us to jump to conclusions. Hume did not deny the existence of unbreakable 'natural laws,' but he held that because we are not in a position to experience the natural laws themselves, we can easily come to the wrong conclusions."

"Like what?"

"Well, because I have seen a whole herd of black horses doesn't mean that all horses are black."

"No, of course not."

"And although I have seen nothing but black crows in my life, it doesn't mean that there's no such thing as a white crow. Both for a philosopher and for a scientist it can be important not to reject the possibility of finding a white crow. You might almost say that hunting for 'the white crow' is science's principal task."

"Yes, I see."

"In the question of cause and effect, there can be many people who imagine that lightning is the cause of thunder because the thunder comes after the lightning. The example is really not so different from the one with the billiard balls. But is lightning the cause of thunder?"

"Not really, because actually they both happen at the same time."

"Both thunder and lightning are due to an electric discharge. So in reality a third factor causes them both."

"Right."

"An empiricist of our own century, Bertrand Russell, has provided a more grotesque example. A chicken which experiences every day that it gets fed when the farmer's wife comes over to the chicken run will finally come to the conclusion that there is a causal link between the approach of the farmer's wife and feed being put into its bowl."

"But one day the chicken doesn't get its food?"

"No, one day the farmer's wife comes over and wrings the chicken's neck."

"Yuck, how disgusting!"

"The fact that one thing follows after another thus does not necessarily mean there is a causal link. One of the main concerns of philosophy is to warn people against jumping to conclusions. It can in fact lead to many different forms of superstition."

"How come?"

"You see a black cat cross the street. Later that day you fall and break your arm. But that doesn't mean there is any causal link between the two incidents. In science, it is especially important not to jump to conclusions. For instance, the fact that a lot of people get well after taking a particular drug doesn't mean it was the drug that cured them. That's why it's important to have a large control group of patients who think they are also being given this same medicine, but who are in fact only being given flour and water. If these patients also get well, there has to be a third factor--such as the belief that the medicine works, and has cured them."

"I think I'm beginning to see what empiricism is."

"Hume also rebelled against rationalist thought in the area of ethics. The rationalists had always held that the ability to distinguish between right and wrong is inherent in human reason. We have come across this idea of a so-called natural right in many philosophers from Socrates to Locke. But according to Hume, it is not reason that determines what we say and do."

"What is it then?"

"It is our sentiments. If you decide to help someone in need, you do so because of your feelings, not your reason."

"What if I can't be bothered to help?"

"That, too, would be a matter of feelings. It is neither reasonable nor unreasonable not to help someone in need, but it could be unkind."

"But there must be a limit somewhere. Everyone knows it's wrong to kill."

"According to Hume, everybody has a feeling for other people's welfare. So we all have a capacity for compassion. But it has nothing to do with reason."

"I don't know if I agree."

"It's not always so unwise to get rid of another person, Sophie. If you wish to achieve something or other, it can actually be quite a good idea."

"Hey, wait a minute! I protest!"

"Maybe you can try and explain why one shouldn't kill a troublesome person."

"'That person wants to live too. Therefore you ought not to kill them."

"Was that a logical reason?"

"I don't know."

"What you did was to draw a conclusion from a descriptive sentence--That person wants to live too'--to what we call a normative sentence: 'Therefore you ought not to kill them.' From the point of view of reason this is nonsense. You might just as well say 'There are lots of people who cheat on their taxes, therefore I ought to cheat on my taxes too.' Hume said you can never draw conclusions from is sentences to ought sentences. Nevertheless it is exceedingly common, not least in newspaper articles, political party programs, and speeches. Would you like some examples?"

"Please."

" 'More and more people want to travel by air. Therefore more airports ought to be built.' Do you think the conclusion holds up?"

"No. It's nonsense. We have to think of the environment. I think we ought to build more railroads instead."

"Or they say: The development of new oilfields will raise the population's living standards by ten percent. Therefore we ought to develop new oilfields as rapidly as possible."

"Definitely not. We have to think of the environment again. And anyway, the standard of living in Norway is high enough."

"Sometimes it is said that 'this law has been passed by the Senate, therefore all citizens in this country ought to abide by it.' But frequently it goes against people's deepest convictions to abide by such conventions."

"Yes, I understand that."

"So we have established that we cannot use reason as a yardstick for how we ought to act. Acting responsibly is not a matter of strengthening our reason but of deepening our feelings for the welfare of others. "Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger,' said Hume."

"That's a hair-raising assertion."

"It's maybe even more hair-raising if you shuffle the cards. You know that the Nazis murdered millions of Jews. Would you say that there was something wrong with the Nazis' reason, or would you say there was something wrong with their emotional life?"

"There was definitely something wrong with their feelings."

"Many of them were exceedingly clear-headed. It is not unusual to find ice-cold calculation behind the most callous decisions. Many of the Nazis were convicted after the war, but they were not convicted for being 'unreasonable.' They were convicted for being gruesome murderers. It can happen that people who are not of sound mind can be acquitted of their crimes. We say that they were 'not accountable for their actions.' Nobody has ever been acquitted of a crime they committed for being unfeeling."

"I should hope not."

"But we need not stick to the most grotesque examples. If a flood disaster renders millions of people homeless, it is our feelings that determine whether we come to their aid. If we are callous, and leave the whole thing to 'cold reason,' we might think it was actually quite in order that millions of people die in a world that is threatened by overpopulation."

"It makes me mad that you can even think that."

"And notice it's not your reason that gets mad."

"Okay, I got it."

8
 楼主| 发表于 2019-1-29 11:19:08 | 只看该作者
休姆

……将它付之一炬……
艾伯特坐在那儿,低头注视着茶几。最后他转过身来,看着窗外。
“云层愈来愈厚了。”苏菲说。
“嗯,天气很闷热。”
“你现在要谈柏克莱了吗?”
“他是三位英国经验主义哲学家中的第二位,但在许多方面他可说是自成一个格局。因此我们还是先谈休姆(DavidHume)好了。休姆生于一七一一到一七七六年间。他是经验主义哲学家中最重要的一位,也是启发大哲学家康德,使他开始走上哲学研究道路的人。”
“你不介意我对柏克莱的哲学比较有兴趣吗?”
休姆“这不重要。休姆生长在苏格兰的爱丁堡附近,家人希望他修习法律,但他觉得自己‘对哲学和学习以外的事物有不可抗拒的排斥心理’。他生在启蒙时代,与法国大思想家伏尔泰与卢梭等人同一个时期。他早年曾经遍游欧洲各地,最后才回到爱丁堡定居,度过余年。他的主要作品是《人性论》(TreatiseonHumanNature),在他二十八岁时出版。但他宣称他在十五岁的时候就有了写这本书的构想。”
“我看我也不应该再浪费时间了。”
“你已经开始了。”
“但如果我要建立一套自己的哲学,那这套哲学会和我们到目前为止所谈过的任何哲学理论都大不相同。”
“你认为我们谈的这些哲学理论缺少了什么东西吗?”
“这个嘛,首先,你谈的这些哲学家都是男人,而男人似乎只活在他们自己的世界里。我对真正的世界比较有兴趣。我是指一个有花、有动物、有小孩出生长大的世界。你说的那些哲学家总是谈什么‘人与人类’的理论。现在又有人写了一本《人性论》,好像这里面的‘人’是一个中年男人似的。我的意思是,生命是从怀孕和生产开始的。但是到目前为止,却从来没有人谈到尿布呀、婴儿啼哭呀什么的。也几乎没有人谈到爱和友情。”
“你说得当然很对。但在这方面,休姆可能和其他哲学家不太一样。他比任何一位哲学家都要能够以日常生活为起点。我甚至认为他对儿童(世界未来的公民)体验生命的方式的感觉很强烈。”
“那我最好洗耳恭听。”
“身为一个经验主义者,休姆期许自己要整理前人所提出的一些混淆不清的思想与观念,包括中世纪到十七世纪这段期间,理性主义哲学家留传下来的许多言论和著作。休姆建议,人应回到对世界有自发性感觉的状态。他说,没有一个哲学家‘能够带我们体验日常生活,而事实上哲学家们提示的那些行为准则都是我们对日常生活加以省思后,便可以领悟出来的’。”
“到目前为止他说的都不错。你能举一些例子吗?”
“在休姆那个时代,人们普遍相信有天使。他们的模样像人,身上长着翅膀。你见过这样的东西吗?”
“没有。”“可是你总见过人吧?”“什么傻问题嘛!”
“你也见过翅膀吗?”“当然,但不是长在人的身上。”
“所以,据休姆的说法,‘天使’是一个复合的概念,由两个不同的经验组成。这两个经验虽然事实上无关,但仍然在人的想象中结合在一起。换句话说,这是一个不实的观念,应该立即受到驳斥。同样的,我们也必须以这种方式厘清自身所有的思想观念和整理自己的藏书。他说,如果我们手里有一本书……我们应该问:‘书里是否包含任何与数量和数目有关的抽象思考?’如果答案是‘没有’,那么我们应该再问:‘书里是否包含任何与事实和存在有关的经验性思考?’如果答案还是‘没有’,那么我们还是将它付之一炬吧,因为这样的书内容纯粹是诡辩和幻象。”
“好激烈呀”
“但世界仍然会存在,而且感觉更清新,轮廓也更分明。休姆希望人们回到孩提时代对世界的印象。你刚才不是说许多哲学家都活在自己的世界里,还说你对真实的世界比较有兴趣吗?”
“没错。”
“休姆可能也会说类似的话。不过我们还是继续谈他的理念吧。”
“请说。”
“休姆首先断定人有两种知觉,一种是印象,一种是观念。‘印象’指的是对于外界实在的直接感受,‘观念’指的是对印象的回忆。”
“能不能举个例子呢?”
“如果你被热炉子烫到,你会马上得到一个‘印象’。事后你会回想自己被烫到这件事,这就是休姆所谓的‘观念’。两者的不同在于‘印象’比事后的回忆要更强烈,也更生动。你可以说感受是原创的,而‘观念’(或省思)则只不过是模仿物而已。‘印象’是在我们的心灵中形成‘观念’的直接原因。”
“到目前为止,我还可以理解。”
“休姆进一步强调印象与观念可能是单一的,也可能是复合的。你还记得我们谈到洛克时曾经以苹果为例子吗?对于苹果的直接经验就是一种复合印象。”
“对不起,打断你的话。这种东西重要吗?”
“你怎么会问这种问题呢?就算哲学家们在建构一个理论的过程中偶尔会讨论一些似乎不是问题的问题,但你也绝对不可以放弃。笛卡尔曾说,一个思考模式必须从最基础处开始建立,我想休姆应该会同意这个说法。”
“好吧,好吧。”
“休姆的意思是:我们有时会将物质世界中原本并不共存的概念放在一起。刚才我们已经举过天使这个例子。以前我们也曾提到‘鳄象’这个例子,另外还有一个例子是‘飞马’。看过这些例子后,我们不得不承认我们的心灵很擅长剪贴拼凑的工作。因为,这些概念中的每一个元素都曾经由我们的感官体验过,并以真正‘印象’的形式进入心灵这个剧场。事实上没有一件事物是由我们的心灵创造的。我们的心灵只是把不同的事物放在一起,创造一个虚假的‘观念’罢了。”
“是的,我明白了。这的确是很重要的。”
“明白了就好。休姆希望审查每一个观念,看看它们是不是以不符合现实的方式复合而成的。他会问:这个观念是从哪一个印象而来的?遇到一个复合观念时,他要先找出这个观念是由哪些‘单一概念’共同组成的,这样他才能够加以批判、分析,并进而厘清我们的观念。”
“你可以举一两个例子吗?”
“在休姆的时代,许多人对‘天堂’或‘新耶路撒冷’有各种生动鲜明的想象。如果你还记得的话,笛卡尔曾说:假使我们对某些事物有‘清楚分明’的概念,则这些事物就可能确实存在。”“我说过,我的记性不差。”
“在经过分析后,我们可以发现我们对‘天堂’的概念事实上是由许多元素复合而成的,例如‘珍珠门’、‘黄金街’和无数个‘天使,等。不过到这个阶段,我们仍然还没有把每一件事物都分解为单一的元素,因为珍珠门、黄金街与天使本身都是复合的概念。只有在我们了解到我们对于天堂的概念实际上是由‘珍珠’、‘门’、‘街道’、‘黄金’、‘穿白袍的人’与‘翅膀’等单一概念所组成后,我们才能自问是否真的有过这些‘单一印象’。”
“我们确实有过,只是后来又把这些‘单一印象’拼凑成一幅想象的图像。”
“对,正是这样。我们在拼凑这类想象图画时除了不用剪刀、浆糊之外,什么都用了。休姆强调,组成一幅想象图画的各个元素必然曾经在某一时刻以‘单一印象’的形式进入我们的心灵。否则一个从未见过黄金的人又怎能想象出黄金街道的模样?”
“很聪明,但他怎么解释笛卡尔对于上帝有很清晰判明的观念这个现象呢?”
“休姆的解释是:假设我们想象上帝是一个无限‘智慧、聪明、善良的事物’,那么‘上帝’这个观念就是由某个无限智慧、某个无限聪明与某个无限善良的事物共同组成的一个‘复合观念’。如果我们不知道何谓智慧、何谓聪明、何谓良善的话,我们绝不可能形成这样一个对上帝的观念。当然,也有些人认为上帝是一个‘严厉但公正的父亲’,但这个观念同样是由‘严厉’、‘正义’与‘父亲’等元素所组成。休姆之后的许多宗教批评人士都指出,人类之所以对上帝有这些观念,可能和我们孩提时代对父亲的感觉有关。他们认为我们对于父亲的观念导致我们对于‘天父’的概念。”
“也许是吧。但我从不认为上帝一定是个男人。有时我妈会叫上帝‘天母’(Godiva)以求公平。”
“无论如何,只要是无法回溯到特定感官认知经验的思想与观念,休姆便不接受。他说他要‘推翻那些长久以来主导哲学思想,使得哲学蒙羞的无稽之谈’。在日常生活中,我们也常使用一些复合观念,而不去思考这些观念是否站得住脚。以‘我’(或自我)这个问题为例。这是笛卡尔哲学的基础,是他全部的哲学赖以建立的一个清晰判明的知觉。”
“我希望休姆不要否认‘我’就是我,否则就真的是太胡扯了。”
“苏菲,我希望这门课能教你不要妄下定论。”
“对不起。你继续说吧。”
“不,我要你用休姆的方法来分析你所认知的你的‘自我’。”
“那我必须先了解自我是一个单一概念,还是复合概念?”
“你认为呢?”
“我必须承认我觉得自己挺复杂的。比方说,我很容易发脾气,也满优柔寡断的。有时候我会对一个人又爱又恨。”
“那么,这个‘自我概念’就是一个‘复合观念’。”
“好吧。那我现在得想一想我是否曾经对于这个自我有过这样的‘复合印象’。我想大概有吧。事实上,我一直都有。”
“你会因此而担心吗?”
“我是很善变的。今天的我已经不是四岁时的我。我的脾气和我对自己的看法可能会在一分钟内改变,我可能会突然觉得自己使‘变了一个人’。”
不可知论者“所以说,以为自己有一个不变的自我事实上是一种不实的认知。你对自我的认知实际上是一长串你同时体验过的单一印象造成的结果。正如休姆说的,这个自我‘只不过是一束不同的知觉以无法想象的速度接连而来,不断改变并移动’的过程。他说,心灵是‘一个剧场。在这个剧场里,不同的感官认知在各种位置和情况下轮流出现、经过、再现、消退及融合’。休姆指出,我们心中有的只是这些来来去去的知觉与感觉,并没有一定的‘自我同一性’(per-sonalidentity)。这就好比我们看电影一样。由于银幕上的影像移动得如此之快,以至于我们无法看出这部电影事实上是由许多不相连的单一图像所‘组成’的。而实际上,一部影片只是许多片刻的集合而已。”
“我投降了。”
“你是说你不再认为人有一个不变的自我了吗?”
“我想是吧。”
“你看,不久前你的想法还正好相反呢!我应该再提到一点:休姆的这些理论在两千五百年前世界的另外一端已经有人提出了。”
“谁?”
“佛陀。不可思议的是,他们两人的想法极为相似。佛陀认为人生就是一连串心灵与肉身的变化,使人处于一种不断改变的状态:婴儿与成人不同,今日的我已非昨日的我。佛陀说,没有什么东西是‘属于我’的,也没有什么东西是我。因此,并没有‘我’或不变的自我。”
“确实很像休姆的论调。”
“许多理性主义者因为认定人有一个不变的自我,所以也理所当然地认为人有一个不朽的灵魂。”
“难道这也是一个不实的认知吗?”
“据休姆和佛陀的看法,这的确是一个不实的认知。你知道佛陀在圆寂前对弟子说什么吗?”
“我怎么会知道?”
“‘世间复合之物必然衰朽,应勤勉修持以求己身之解脱。’这很像是休姆或德漠克里特斯会说的话。无论如何,休姆认为人类没有必要去证明灵魂不朽或上帝确实存在。这并不是因为他认为人没有不朽的灵魂或上帝不存在,而是因为他认为要用人类的理性来证明宗教信仰是不可能的。休姆不是一个基督徒,但也不是一个无神论者,他是我们所谓的‘不可知论者’。”
“什么意思?”
“就是指一个怀疑上帝是否存在的人。休姆临终时,有一个朋友问他是否相信人死后还有生命。据说他的回答是:‘一块煤炭放在火上也可能不会燃烧。”’“我懂了。”
“休姆的心灵没有任何成见。这个回答就是一个典型的例子。
他只接受他用感官所认知的事物。他认为除此之外,一切事情都有待证实。他并不排斥基督教或奇迹,但他认为两者都属于信仰的范踌,与知识或理性无关。我们可以说在休姆哲学的影响下,信仰与知识的关系终于被切断了。”
“你说他并不否认奇迹可能会发生?”
“但这也并不表示他相信奇迹。事实上正好相反。休姆指出,这些被现代人称为‘超自然现象’的奇迹似乎很少发生,因为我们所听过的奇迹统统发生在一些遥远的地方或古老的年代。实际上,休姆之所以不相信奇迹,只是因为他从未体验过任何奇迹。但他也从来没有体验过奇迹一定不会发生。”
“请你说得明白一些。”“根据休姆的看法,奇迹是违反自然法则的。但是我们不能宣÷称自己已经体验过自然法则,因为这是没有意义的。我们放掉一块石头时,会体验到石头掉在地上的事实。但如果石头不掉在地上,那也是我们的体验之一。”
“要是我的话,我就会说这是一个奇迹,或是超自然现象。”
“这么说你相信有两种自然——一种是‘自然的’自然,一种是‘超自然’的自然。那你不是又回到理性主义的空谈了吗?”
“也许吧。但我还是认为我每次把石头放掉时,它一定会掉到地上。”
“为什么?”
“这还用问吗?”
“不是这样,苏菲。哲学家问问题是绝对没有错的。从这个问题出发,我们也许会谈到休姆哲学的要点。请你告诉我你为什么会这么肯定石头每次都会掉下来?”
“我看过太多次了,所以我才百分之百肯定。”
“休姆会说你只是有许多次石头掉在地上的经验而已,但你从来没有体验过它一定会掉。通常我们会说石头之所以掉到地上是受到重力定律的影响,但我们从未体验到这种定律。我们只是有过东西掉下来的经验而已。”
“那不是一样吗?”
“不完全一样。你说你相信石头会掉在地上的原因是你见过它发生很多次,这正是休姆的重点所在。事情发生一次又一次之后,你会变得非常习惯,以至于每次你放开石头时,总会期待发生同样的事,所以才会形成我们所谓的‘自然界不变的法则’。”
“那么他的意思是说石头可能不会掉下来吗?”
“他也许和你一样相信石头每次都会掉下来,但他指出他还没有体验到这种现象发生的原因。”
“你看,我们又远离婴儿和花朵了。”
“不,事实上正好相反。你大可以拿孩童来证明休姆的理论。如果石头浮在空中一两个小时,你想谁会比较惊讶?是你还是一个一岁大的婴儿?”
“我想是我。”
“为什么呢?苏菲。”
“因为我比那孩子更明白这种现象是超自然的。”
“为什么那个孩子不认为这是一种超自然的现象呢?”
“因为他还没有了解大自然的规律。”
“还是因为他还没有习惯大自然?”
“我明白你的意思了。休姆希望人们能够让自己的知觉更敏锐。”
“所以现在我要你做个练习;假设你和一个小孩子一起去看一场魔术表演,看到魔术师让一些东西浮在空中。你想,你们两个当中哪一个会看得比较津津有味?”
“我想是我。”
“为什么呢?”
“因为我知道这种现象是多么不可能。”
“所以说,在那个孩子还不了解自然法则之前,他看到违反自然法则的现象时,就不会觉得很有意思啰?”
“应该是吧。”
习惯性期待“这也是休姆的经验哲学的要点。他可能会说,那孩子还没有成为‘习惯性期待’的奴隶。在你们两个当中,他是比较没有成见的一个。我想,小孩子应该比较可能成为好哲学家,因为他们完全没有任何先人为主的观念。而这正是哲学家最与众不同的地方。小孩子眼中所见到的乃是世界的原貌,他不会再添加任何的东西。。
“每一次我察觉到人家有偏见的时候,感觉都很不好。”
“休姆谈到习惯对人的影响时,强调所谓的‘因果法则’,也就是说每一件事的发生必有其原因。他举两个撞球台上的球做为例子。如果你将一个黑球推向一个静止的白球,白球会怎样?”
“如果黑球碰到白球,白球就会开始滚动。”
“嗯,那么白球为什么会这样呢?”
“因为它被黑球碰到了呀。”
“所以我们通常说黑球的撞击是白球开始滚动的原因。可是不要忘了,我们只能讨论我们自己实际经验到的。”
“我已经有很多这种经验了呀。乔安家的地下室就有一座撞球台。”
“如果是休姆的话,他会说你所经验到的唯一事件是白球开始滚过台面。你并没有经验到它滚动的实际原因。你只经验到一件事情发生之后,另外一件事情跟着发生,但你并没有经验到第一件事是第二件事的原因。”
“这不是有点吹毛求疵吗?”
“不,这是很重要的。休姆强调的是,‘一件事情发生后另外一件事情也会发生’的想法,只是我们心中的一种期待,并不是事物的本质,而期待心理乃是与习惯有关。让我们再回到小孩子的心态吧。一个小孩子就算看到一个球碰到另外一个,而两个球都静止不动时,也不会目瞪口呆。所谓‘自然法则’或‘因果律’,实际上只是我们所期待的现象,并非‘理当如此’。自然法则没有所谓合理或不合理,它们只是存在罢了。白球被黑球碰到后会移动的现象只是我们的期待,并不是天生就会这样。我们出生时对这世界的面貌和世间种种现象并没有什么期待。这世界就是这个样子,我们需要慢慢去了解它。”
“我开始觉得我们又把话题扯远了。”
“不。因为我们的期待往往使我们妄下定论。休姆并不否认世间有不变的‘自然法则’。但他认为,由于我们无法体验自然法则本身,因此很容易做出错误的结论。”
“比如说……?”
“比如说,因为自己看到的马都是黑马,就以为世间的马都是黑色的。其实不是这样。”
“当然不是。”
“我这一辈子只见过黑色的乌鸦,但这并不表示世间没有白色的乌鸦。无论哲学家也好,科学家也好,都不能否认世间可能有白色的乌鸦。这是很重要的。我们几乎可以说科学的主要任务就是找寻‘白色的乌鸦’。”
“嗯,我懂了。”
“谈到因果问题时,可能很多人会以为闪电是造成打雷的原因,因为每次闪电之后就会打雷,这个例子和黑白球的例子并没有什么不同。可是,打雷真的是闪电造成的吗?”
“不是。事实上两者是同时发生的。”
“打雷和闪电都是由于放电作用所致,所以事实上是另外一种因素造成了这两个现象。”
“对。”
“二十世纪的实验主义哲学家罗素(BertrandRussell)举了另外一个比较可怕的例子。他说,有一只鸡发现每天农妇来到鸡舍时,它就有东西可吃。久而久之,它就认定农妇的到来与饲料被放在钵子里这两件事之间必然有某种关联。”
“后来是不是有一天这只鸡发现农妇没有喂它?”
“不是,有一天农妇跑来把这只鸡的脖子扭断了。”
“真恶心。”
“所以,我们可以知道:一件事情跟着另外一件事情发生,并不一定表示两者之间必有关联。哲学的目的之一就是教人们不要妄下定论。因为,妄下定论可能会导致许多迷信。”
“怎么会呢?”
“假设有一天你看到一只黑猫过街,后来你就摔了一交,跌断了手。这并不表示这两件事有任何关联。在做科学研究时,我们尤其要避免妄下结论。举个例子,有很多人吃了某一种药之后,病就好了,但这并不表示他们是被那种药治好的。这也是为什么科学家们在做实验时,总是会将一些病人组成一个所谓的‘控制组’。这些病人以为他们跟另外一组病人服用同样的药,但实际上他们吃的只是面粉和水。如果这些病人也好了,那就表示他们的病之所以痊愈另有原因,也可能是因为他们相信那种药有效,于是在心理作用之下,他们的病就好了。”
“我想我开始了解经验主义的意义了。”
“在伦理学方面,休姆也反对理性主义者的想法。理性主义者一向认为人的理性天生就能辨别是非对错。从苏格拉底到洛克,许多哲学家都主张有所谓的‘自然权利’。但休姆则认为,我们的言语和行为并不是由理性决定的。”
“那么是由什么决定的呢?”
“由我们的感情来决定。譬如说,当你决定要帮助某个需要帮助的人时,那是出自你的感情,而不是出自你的理智。”
“如果我不愿意帮忙呢?”
“那也是由于你的感情。就算你不想帮助一个需要帮助的人,这也没有什么合理或不合理可言,只是不怎么仁慈罢了。”
“可是这种事一定有个限度呀。譬如说,每一个人都知道杀人是不对的。”
“根据休姆的看法,每一个人都能感受别人的悲喜苦乐,所以我们都有同情心。但这和理智没有什么关系。”
“这点我不太同意。”
“有时候,除掉一个人并不一定是不智的,甚至可能是个好办法,如果你想达成某个目的的话。”
“嘿,慢着!我反对。”
“那么请你告诉我,为什么你认为我们不应该把一个使我们头痛的人杀掉。”
“那个人也想活下去呀j因此你不应该杀他。”
“这个理由是根据逻辑吗?”
“我不知道。”
“你从一句描述性语句‘那个人也想活’而得出你的结论‘因此你不应该杀他’。后者是我们所谓的‘规范性语句’。从理性的观点来看,这是说不通的。否则我们岂不是也可以说‘有很多人逃漏税,因此我也应该逃漏税’。休姆指出,我们绝不能从‘是不是’的语句,得出‘该不该’的结论。不过,这种现象非常普遍,无论报纸的文章或政党的演讲都充满了这样的句子。你要不要我举一些例子?”
“要。”
“愈来愈多人出门时想搭飞机,因此我们应该兴建更多的机场。’你认为这样的结论成立吗?”
“不,这是说不通的。我们必须考虑环保问题,我想我们应该兴建更多的铁路才对。”
“也可能有人会说:‘开发油田将会提高人民的生活水准达百分之十,因此我们应该尽快开发新的油田。”
“胡说八道。我们还是应该考虑我们的环境,何况挪威的生活水准已经够高了。”
“有时有人会说:‘这项法令已经由参议院通过了,因此所有民众都应该加以遵守。’可是民众常常并不认为他们应该遵守这类法案。”
“嗯,我明白。”
“所以我们已经肯定我们不能以理智做为行事的标准。因为,我们之所以做出负责任的举动并不是因为我们的理智发达的结果,而是因为我们同情别人的处境。休姆说:‘一个人可能宁愿整个地球遭到毁灭也不愿意自己的手指被割到。这与理智并没有什么冲突。’”
“这种说法真可怕。”
“如果你看看历史,可能会觉得更可怕。你知道纳粹分子杀害了几百万犹太人,你会说是这些人的理性有问题呢,还是他们的感情有问题?”
“他们的感情一定异于常人。”
“他们当中有许多都是头脑非常清楚的人。要知道,最无情、最冷血的决定,有时是经过最冷静的筹划的。许多纳粹党人在战后被定了罪,但理由并不是因为他们‘没有理性’,而是因为他们的罪行令人发指。有时那些心智丧失的人倒可以免罪,因为我们说他们‘无法为自己的行为负责’。可是到目前为止还没有人因为丧失感情而被免罪。”
“本来就不应该这样。”
“我们还是不要谈这么可怕的例子吧。现在如果有几百万人因为洪水而无家可归,我们究竟要不要伸以援手完全是凭感情而定。
如果我们是无情冷血、完全讲求‘理性’的人,我们也许会觉得在世界人口已经过剩的情况下,死掉个几百万人其实也没什么不好。”
“太过分了,怎么可以这样想呢?”
“请注意,现在生气的并不是你的理智。”
“好吧,我懂你的意思了。”
9
 楼主| 发表于 2019-1-29 11:19:39 | 只看该作者
Berkeley

like a giddy planet round a burning sun

Alberto walked over to the window facing the town. Sophie followed him. While they stood looking out at the old houses, a small plane flew in over the rooftops. Fixed to its tail was a long banner which Sophie guessed would be advertising some product or local event, a rock concert perhaps. But as it approached and turned, she saw quite a different message: HAPPY BIRTHDAY, HILDE!

"Gate-crasher," was Alberto's only comment.

Heavy black clouds from the hills to the south were now beginning to gather over the town. The little plane disappeared into the grayness.

"I'm afraid there's going to be a storm," said Alberto.

"So I'll take the bus home."

"I only hope the major isn't behind this, too."

"He's not God Almighty, is he?"

Alberto did not reply. He walked across the room and sat down again by the coffee table.

"We have to talk about Berkeley," he said after a while.

Sophie had already resumed her place. She caught herself biting her nails.

"George Berkeley was an Irish bishop who lived from 1685 to 1753," Alberto began. There was a long silence.

"Berkeley was an Irish bishop ..." Sophie prompted.

"But he was a philosopher as well..."

"Yes?"

"He felt that current philosophies and science were a threat to the Christian way of life, that the all-pervading materialism, not least, represented a threat to the Christian faith in God as creator and preserver of all nature."

"He did?"

"And yet Berkeley was the most consistent of the empiricists."

"He believed we cannot know any more of the world than we can perceive through the senses?"

"More than that. Berkeley claimed that worldly things are indeed as we perceive them, but they are not 'things.' "

"You'll have to explain that."

"You remember that Locke pointed out that we cannot make statements about the 'secondary qualities' of things. We cannot say an apple is green and sour. We can only say we perceive it as being so. But Locke also said that the 'primary qualities' like density, gravity, and weight really do belong to the external reality around us. External reality has, in fact, a material substance."

"I remember that, and I think Locke's division of things was important."

"Yes, Sophie, if only that were all."

"Goon."

"Locke believed--just like Descartes and Spinoza-- that the material world is a reality."

"Yes?"

"This is just what Berkeley questioned, and he did so by the logic of empiricism. He said the only things that exist are those we perceive. But we do not perceive 'material' or 'matter.' We do not perceive things as tangible objects. To assume that what we perceive has its own underlying 'substance' is jumping to conclusions. We have absolutely no experience on which to base such a claim."

"How stupid. Look!" Sophie thumped her fist hard on the table. "Ouch," she said. "Doesn't that prove that this table is really a table, both of material and matter?"

"How did you feel it?"

"I felt something hard."

"You had a sensation of something hard, but you didn't feel the actual matter in the table. In the same way, you can dream you are hitting something hard, but there isn't anything hard in a dream, is there?"

"No, not in a dream."

"A person can also be hypnotized into 'feeling' things like warmth and cold, a caress or a punch."

"But if the table wasn't really hard, why did I feel it?"

"Berkeley believed in a 'spirit.' He thought all our ideas have a cause beyond our consciousness, but that this cause is not of a material nature. It is spiritual."

Sophie had started biting her nails again.

Alberto continued: "According to Berkeley, my own soul can be the cause of my own ideas--just as when I dream--but only another will or spirit can be the cause of the ideas that make up the 'corporeal' world. Everything is due to that spirit which is the cause of 'everything in everything' and which 'all things consist in,' he said."

"What 'spirit' was he talking about?"

"Berkeley was of course thinking of God. He said that 'we can moreover claim that the existence of God is far more clearly perceived than the existence of man."'

"Is it not even certain that we exist?"

"Yes, and no. Everything we see and feel is 'an effect of God's power,' said Berkeley. For God is 'intimately present in our consciousness, causing to exist for us the profusion of ideas and perceptions that we are constantly subject to.' The whole world around us and our whole life exist in God. He is the one cause of everything that exists. We exist only in the mind of God."

"I am amazed, to put it mildly."

"So 'to be or not to be' is not the whole question. The question is also who we are. Are we really human beings of flesh and blood? Does our world consist of real things--or are we encircled by the mind?"

Sophie continued to bite her nails.

Alberto went on: "Material reality was not the only thing Berkeley was questioning. He was also questioning whether 'time' and 'space' had any absolute or independent existence. Our own perception of time and space can also be merely figments of the mind. A week or two for us need not be a week or two for God ..."

"You said that for Berkeley this spirit that everything exists in is the Christian God."

"Yes, I suppose I did. But for us ..."

"Us?"

"For us--for you and me--this 'will or spirit' that is the 'cause of everything in everything' could be Hilde's father."

Sophie's eyes opened wide with incredulity. Yet at the same time a realization began to dawn on her.

"Is that what you think?"

"I cannot see any other possibility. That is perhaps the only feasible explanation for everything that has happened to us. All those postcards and signs that have turned up here and there... Hermes beginning to talk ... my own involuntary slips of the tongue."

"I..."

"Imagine my calling you Sophie, Hilde! I knew all the time that your name wasn't Sophie."

"What are you saying? Now you are definitely confused."

"Yes, my mind is going round and round, my child. Like a giddy planet round a burning sun."

"And that sun is Hilde's father?"

"You could say so."

"Are you saying he's been a kind of God for us?"

"To be perfectly candid, yes. He should be ashamed of himself!"

"What about Hilde herself?"

"She is an angel, Sophie."

"An angel?"

"Hilde is the one this 'spirit' turns to."

"Are you saying that Albert Knag tells Hilde about us?"

"Or writes about us. For we cannot perceive the matter itself that our reality is made of, that much we have learned. We cannot know whether our external reality is made of sound waves or of paper and writing. According to Berkeley, all we can know is that we are spirit."

"And Hilde is an angel..."

"Hilde is an angel, yes. Let that be the last word. Happy birthday, Hilde!"

Suddenly the room was filled with a bluish light. A few seconds later they heard the crash of thunder and the whole house shook.

"I have to go," said Sophie. She got up and ran to the front door. As she let herself out, Hermes woke up from his nap in the hallway. She thought she heard him say, "See you later, Hilde."

Sophie rushed down the stairs and ran out into the street. It was deserted. And now the rain came down in torrents.

One or two cars were plowing through the downpour, but there were no buses in sight. Sophie ran across Main Square and on through the town. As she ran, one thought kept going round and round in her mind: "Tomorrow is my birthday* Isn't it extra bitter to realize that life is only a dream on the day before your fifteenth birthday? It's like dreaming you won a million and then just as you're getting the money you wake up."

Sophie ran across the squelching playing field. Minutes later she saw someone come running toward her. It was her mother. The sky was pierced again and again by angry darts of lightning.

When they reached each other Sophie's mother put her arm around her.

"What's happening to us, little one?"

"I don't know," Sophie sobbed. "It's like a bad dream."
10
 楼主| 发表于 2019-1-29 11:20:15 | 只看该作者
柏克莱

……宛如燃烧的恒星旁一颗晕眩的行星……
艾伯特走到面向市区的那一扇窗户旁。苏菲也过去站在他身边。
当他们站在那儿看着外面那些古老的房子时,突然有一架小飞机飞到那些屋顶的上方,机尾挂了一块长布条。苏菲猜想那大概是某项产品、某种活动或某场摇滚音乐会的广告。但是当它飞近,机身转向时,她看到上面写的是:“席德,生日快乐!”
“不请自来。”艾伯特只说了一句。
这时,从南边山上下来的浓厚乌云已经开始聚集在市区上方了。小飞机逐渐隐没在灰色的云层中。
“恐怕会有暴风雨呢。”艾伯特说。
“所以我回家时必须坐车才行。”
“我只希望这不是少校的计谋之一。”
“他又不是万能的上帝。”
艾伯特没有回答。他走到房间的另一头,再度坐在茶几旁。
过了一会,他说:“我们得谈谈柏克莱。”
此时苏菲已经坐回原位。她发现自己开始咬起指甲来。
柏克莱“柏克莱(GeorgeBerkeley)是爱尔兰的一位天主教的主教,生于一六八五到一七五三年间。”艾伯特开始说,然后便沉默了很长一段时间。
“你刚才说到柏克莱是爱尔兰的一位主教……”苏菲提醒他。
“他也是一个哲学家……”
“是吗?”
“他觉得当时的哲学与科学潮流可能会对基督徒的生活方式有不利的影响。他认为他那个时代无所不在的唯物主义,将会腐蚀基督徒对于上帝这位创造者与大自然保护者的信心。”
“是吗?”
“然而他也是经验主义哲学家中理论最一贯的一位。”
“他也认为我们对世界的知识只能经由感官的认知而获得吗?”
“不只是这样。柏克莱宣称世间的事物的确是像我们所感知的那样。但它们并非‘事物’。”
“请你解释一下好吗?”.“你还记得洛克说我们无法陈述事物的‘次要性质’吗?例如,我们不能说一个苹果是绿的或酸的。我们只能说我们感觉到它是绿的或酸的。但洛克同时也说像密度、比重和重量等‘主要性质’确实是我们周遭的外在真实世界的特性。而外在的真实世界具有物质的实体。”
“我记得。而且我也认为洛克区分事物的方式是很重要的。”
“是的,苏菲,但事实上并不只于此。”
“说下去。”
“洛克和笛卡尔、史宾诺莎一样,认为物质世界是真实的。”
“然后呢?”
“但柏克莱却对这点提出了疑问。他利用经验主义的逻辑提出这个疑问。他说,世间所存在的只有那些我们感受到的事情。但我们并未感受到‘物质’或‘质料’。我们无法察知我们所感受到的事物是否确实存在。他认为,如果我们认定自己所感知到的事物之下有‘实体’存在,我们就是妄下结论,因为我们绝对没有任何经验可以支持这样的说法。”
“胡说八道!你看!”
苏菲用拳头重重地捶了一下桌子。
“好痛。”她说。“难道这不能证明这张桌子的确是一张桌子,既是物质,也是质料?”
“你觉得这张桌子怎么样呢?”
“很硬。”
“你感觉到一个硬的东西,可是你并没有感觉到实际存在于桌子里的物质,对不对?同样的,你可以梦见自己碰到一个硬物,可是梦里不会有硬的东西,对不对?”
“没错。”
“人也会在被催眠的状态下‘感觉’冷或热,感觉被人抚摸或被人打了一拳。”
“可是如果桌子实际上不是硬的,我又怎么会有这种感觉呢?”
“柏克莱相信人有‘灵’。他认为我们所有的观念都有一个我们意识不到的成因。但这个成因不是物质的,而是精神性的。”
灵苏菲又开始咬指甲了。艾伯特继续说:“根据柏克莱的看法,我们的灵魂可能是形成我们本身各种概念的原因,就像我们在做梦时一般。但世间只有另外一个意志或灵可能形成造就这个‘形体’世界的诸般概念。他说,万物都是因为这个灵而存在,这个灵乃是‘万物中的万物’的成因,也是‘所有事物存在之处’。”
“他说的这个‘灵’是怎样的一个东西?”
“他指的当然是天主。他宣称:‘我们可以说天主的存在比人的存在要更能够让人清楚地感知到。”’“难道连我们是否存在都不确定吗?”
“可以说是,也可以说不是。柏克莱说,我们所看见、所感觉到的每一件事物都是‘天主力量的作用’,因为天主‘密切存在于我们的意识中,造成那些我们不断体会到的丰富概念与感官体验’。他认为,我们周遭的世界与我们的生命全都存在于天主之中。他是万物唯一的成因,同时我们只存在于天主的心中。”
“太让人惊讶了。”
“因此,tobeornottobe并不是唯一的问题。问题在于我们是什么。我们真的是血肉之躯的人类吗?我们的世界是由真实的事物组成的吗?或者我们只是受到心灵的包围?”
苏菲再度咬起指甲来。艾伯特继续说:“柏克莱不只质疑物质真实性的问题,他也提出了‘时间’和‘空间’是否绝对存在或独立存在的问题。他认为,我们对于时间与空间的认知可能也只是由我们的心灵所虚构的产物而已。我们的----两个星期并不一定等于上帝的一两个星期……”
“你刚才说柏克莱认为这个万物所存在于其中的灵乃是天主?”
“是的。但对我们来说……”
“我们?”
“……对于你我来说,这个‘造成万物中之万物’的‘意志或灵’可能是席德的父亲。”
苏菲震惊极了。她的眼睛睁得大大的,一副不可置信的样子。
但同时她也开始悟出一些道理来。
“你真的这么想吗?”
“除此之外,我看不出还有别的可能。只有这样,才能解释我们所经历的这些事情,包括那些到处出现的明信片和标语、汉密士开口说人话……还有我经常不由自主地叫错你的名字。”
“我……”
“我居然叫你苏菲,席德。我一直都知道你的名字不叫苏菲。”
“你说什么?你这回是真的胡涂了。”
“是的,我的脑子正转呀转的,像围绕燃烧的恒星旋转的一颗晕眩的星球。”
“而那颗恒星就是席德的父亲吗?”
“可以这么说。”
“你是说他有点像是在扮演我们的上帝吗?”
“坦白说,是的。他应该觉得惭愧才对。”
“那席德呢?”
“她是个天使,苏菲。”
“天使?”
“因为她是这个‘灵’诉求的对象。”
“你是说艾勃特把关于我们的事告诉席德?”
“也可能是写的。因为我们不能感知那组成我们的现实世界的物质,这是我们到目前为止所学到的东西。我们无法得知我们的外在现实世界是由声波组成还是由纸和书写的动作组成。根据柏克莱的说法,我们唯一能够知道的就是我们是灵。”
“而席德是个天使……”
“是的,席德是个天使。我们就说到这里为止吧。生日快乐,席德!”
突然间房里充满了一种红光。几秒钟后,他们听见雷电劈空声音,整栋房子都为之摇撼。
“我得回家了。”苏菲说。她站起身,跑到前门。她刚走出来,厉本在门廊上睡午觉的汉密士就醒过来了。她走时,仿佛听到它说“再见,席德。”
苏菲冲下楼梯,跑到街上。整条街都空无一人。雨已经开始滂沱地下着。
偶尔有一两辆车在雨中穿梭而过。但却连一辆公车的影踪也没有。苏菲跑过大广场,然后穿过市区。她一边跑时,脑中不断浮现一个念头。
明天就是我的生日了,苏菲心想。在十五岁生日前夕突然领悟到生命只不过是一场梦境而已,那种感觉真是分外苦涩啊!就好像是你中了一百万大奖,正要拿到钱时,却发现这只不过是南柯一梦。
苏菲啪哒啪哒地跑过泥泞的运动场。几分钟后,她看见有人跑,向她,原来是妈妈。此时闪电正发怒般一再劈过天际。
当她们跑到彼此身边时,妈妈伸出手臂搂着苏菲。
“孩子,我们到底发生什么事了?”
“我不知道,”苏菲啜泣。“好像一场噩梦一样。”
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